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INTRODUCTION
In response to an increase in bankruptcy-related litigation, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) has declared, as
of late, that it has concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy courts regarding
the rejection of filed rates due to its exclusive jurisdiction over such rates,
which purportedly “carry the force of law.”1 The bankruptcy courts,2
district courts,3 and circuit courts4 that have addressed whether a FERC
regulated filed rate is subject to rejection in bankruptcy have yet to
establish a consistent analysis or ruling on the issue. To date, the only
United States Courts of Appeals to have definitively ruled on the matter
are the Fifth and Sixth circuits, and the two have reached somewhat
different results.5 In 2020, the issue evaded determination in the Ninth
Circuit when Pacific Gas & Electric’s (PG&E) case on appeal from the
Copyright 2022, by BRADLEY G. OSTER.
 J.D./Energy Law and Policy Certificate candidate 2022, Paul M. Hebert
Law Center, Louisiana State University.
1. ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at PP 20, 33 (2020) (citing
Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc. 375 F.3d 831, 853 (9th Cir. 2004)).
2. See, e.g., In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019),
vacated and appeal dismissed, PG&E v. FERC, 829 F. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 2020)
(holding that the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over rejection).
3. See, e.g., In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding
that the courts are preempted by the FPA regarding rejection of a filed rate).
4. See, e.g., In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2019)
(holding that the bankruptcy court has concurrent but superior jurisdiction).
5. Compare In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004), with In re
FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d 431.
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bankruptcy court was vacated as moot.6 In December 2020, Ultra
Petroleum Corporation’s bankruptcy case was certified for appeal in the
Fifth Circuit.7 Additionally, ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC petitioned for
bankruptcy in the Southern District of Texas in June 2020; that case is still
pending.8 Although the Fifth Circuit has binding precedent on the issue,
the court has not addressed the issue since it first arose over 16 years ago.9
Further, in November 2020, the busiest10 and presumably most
experienced bankruptcy court in the country, the District of Delaware,
weighed in on the issue for the first time.11 Because only two circuits have
addressed this issue, and because both circuits based their decisions, in
part, on their own circuit precedent, this Comment seeks to resolve the
jurisdictional conflict, irrespective of circuit precedent, based on the
accompanying statutes of the Federal Power Act (FPA) and Bankruptcy
Code, as well as Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, this Comment
will examine and weigh the competing arguments concerning whether a
filed rate, and its performance thereon, is subject to rejection, and if so, the
standard of review to be used in approving such rejection.
Part I of this Comment explores the background information and
relevant points of law governing FERC, including the FPA, the filed rate
doctrine, and the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. Additionally, Part I lays out the
relevant portions of the Bankruptcy Code. Part II analyzes the effect of
rejection in bankruptcy in light of the Supreme Court’s 2019 ruling in
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC.12 Further, Part II
examines relevant jurisprudence interpreting whether rejection results in a
mere breach of contract, or rather, whether it results in abrogation or
modification of the contract. Part III briefly presents the varying
approaches courts have taken when analyzing the issue of whether a filed

6. PG&E, 603 B.R. 471, vacated and appeal dismissed, PG&E, 829 F.
App’x 751.
7. In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 621 B.R. 188 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020);
Rockies Express Pipeline LLC v. Ultra Res., Inc., No. 4:20-CV2306, 2020 WL
7323356 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2020).
8. See generally ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at PP 20, 33
(2020).
9. See generally In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511.
10. Zoë Read, Prominence of Delaware Bankruptcy Court Threatened, WHYY
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://whyy.org/articles/prominence-delaware-bankruptcy-courtthreatened/ [https://perma.cc/3RVD-H94R] (explaining that according to a 2017
U.S. District Court of Delaware report, “Delaware’s Bankruptcy Court has the
highest weighted caseload per judge in the country”).
11. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, 622 B.R. 608 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
12. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652 (2019).
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rate is simply a contract, subject to rejection in bankruptcy, or whether it
is a de jure regulation, subject only to FERC’s jurisdiction. Building on
that background, Part IV confronts arguments supporting the belief that a
filed rate is a de jure regulation that carries the force of law by examining
FERC’s statutory authority and relevant cases and their applicability in
bankruptcy. Assuming bankruptcy courts have either exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction in the rejection of filed rates, Part V addresses the
proper standard of review that should apply when determining whether a
filed rate should be rejected—namely, whether the business judgment rule
or a heightened standard of review applies. Last, Part VI concludes that
the power to reject a filed rate is vested exclusively in bankruptcy courts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Power Act
In 1935, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act (FPA) for the
purpose of protecting and supplying consumers with a plentiful supply of
electricity at reasonable prices.13 Historically, the interstate transmission
of electricity was found to be susceptible to natural monopoly14 and thus
subject to abuses of power.15 Congress found that the sale and transmission
of electricity was affected with a public interest and deemed it necessary
to protect that public interest through federal regulation.16 Accordingly,
the FPA brought the transmission of wholesale and interstate electricity
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission, the predecessor

13. In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
14. Albert A. Foer & Diana L. Moss, Electricity in Transition: Implications
for Regulation and Antitrust, 24 ENERGY L. REV. 89, 92 (2005) (“Natural
monopoly means that a single firm can serve the market at the least cost.”
Essentially, electricity is more price efficient when an integrated public utility
controls the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. “Therefore,
regulating the natural monopolist balances the efficiency garnered by least-cost
production . . . against the inefficiency of monopoly pricing.”).
15. Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc., v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 530 (2008); see Richard Campbell, The Federal Power Act
(FPA) and Electricity Markets, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, at 2 n.6
(Mar. 10, 2017), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44783 [https://
perma.cc/AD4Z-PZT8] (describing the “shady business practices” and noting that
three holding companies controlled almost half of the industry prior to the
enactment of the FPA).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) for the corollary statute
of the Natural Gas Act.
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of the current FERC.17 FERC’s power and regulatory oversight does not
extend, however, to matters of intrastate transmission or retail sales.18
In addition to FERC’s power over interstate and wholesale rates, it
also has authority over rules and practices affecting these rates.19 The
Supreme Court has adopted a “common-sense” interpretation of the term
“affecting” to mean rules that “directly” affect the wholesale rate.20
Moreover, FERC has the power to “perform any and all acts” and to issue,
amend, or rescind any rules, regulations, or orders that it finds necessary
to carry out its power.21
To further the objectives of the FPA, § 205 of the FPA requires that
all rates and charges in connection with the interstate transmission and
wholesale sales of electricity, as well as all rules and regulations affecting
such rates and charges, be “just and reasonable.”22 To satisfy this standard,
every public utility23 subject to FERC’s jurisdiction is prohibited from
granting any undue preference or maintaining any unreasonable difference
in rates amongst different localities or classes of service.24 So that FERC
may ensure compliance, every public utility must file its rates and charges
with FERC, creating what is known as a filed rate.25 Further, § 206 of the
FPA provides that if FERC, on its own motion or upon complaint, finds
that a rate or rule is unlawful because it is “unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory or preferential,” FERC shall replace that rate with a lawful
one.26

17. Id. § 824(b)(1); Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 573 n.3 (1981).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
19. Id. §§ 824(b), 824e(a); In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 444–
56 (6th Cir. 2019) (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766 (2016)).
20. In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 444–56 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760,
766 (2016)).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 825h; see also Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361,
369–70 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that the “necessary and appropriate” provision is
“far from an unbounded grant of remedial authority.”); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)
(granting bankruptcy courts similar power to carry out the provisions of its
authority).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
23. Id. § 824(e) defines public utility as any juridical person who owns or
operates facilities subject to the jurisdiction of FERC.
24. Id. § 824d(b).
25. Id. § 824d(c).
26. Id. § 824e(a); see Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc., v. Pub. Util. Dist. No.
1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 531–32 (2008).
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Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA “are in all material respects
substantially identical” to §§ 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act (NGA).27
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has a longstanding and “established
practice of citing interchangeably decisions interpreting the pertinent
sections of the two statutes.”28 For purposes of this Comment, unless stated
otherwise, cases and arguments for the FPA and NGA will likewise be
used interchangeably.
1. Filed Rate Doctrine
The determination of just and reasonable rates is an administrative
discretionary determination of lawfulness.29 The statutory mandate that
rates be just and reasonable is not defined or further explained in the
accompanying statutes of the FPA, and the Supreme Court has noted that
just and reasonable rates are “incapable of precise judicial definition.”30
Accordingly, significant deference is afforded to FERC’s determination,
but FERC must choose a method of determination that best balances the
interests of the investor and consumer.31
Once a rate is filed, it is the only rate a public utility can charge or
collect.32 Therefore, what a party merely perceives as just and reasonable
does not give rise to a justiciable right, meaning a party cannot typically
litigate in a court of law that the rate being charged is not just and
reasonable.33 Pursuant to its authority, only FERC can decide whether a
27. FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353 (1956).
28. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 576 n.7 (1981).
29. See Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1950).
30. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532; see also Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co., 341
U.S. at 251 (“To reduce the abstract concept of reasonableness to concrete
expression in dollars and cents is the function of the Commission.”).
31. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532.
32. Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577.
33. Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co., 341 U.S. at 248–52. The parties in this case had
contracts filed with the Federal Power Commission. Subsequently, the petitioner
sought judicial relief in the form of reparations from what it alleged to be
“unreasonably high prices,” which were the product of “fraudulent and unlawful”
means. According to the petitioner, this violated its “federally conferred right” to
just and reasonable rates. The Court concluded that the petitioner could not “claim
[a] rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate,” and held that:
the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the Commission
files or fixes, and that, except for review of the Commission’s orders, the
courts can assume no right to a different one on the ground that, in its
opinion, it is the only or more reasonable one.
Id.
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rate is just and reasonable, and the only legal right a party may claim is to
the rate that has been filed with FERC.34 This preserves FERC’s primary
jurisdiction over rates and ensures that FERC is cognizant of the rates
being charged.35
This deference, in turn, created the so-called filed rate doctrine, which
prohibits courts from interfering with filed rates, and instead preserves
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over the rates, terms, and conditions of
interstate or wholesale sales of electricity.36 Accordingly, because FERC
has exclusive jurisdiction over the reasonableness of rates, filed rates may
not be collaterally attacked in courts,37 and courts will not substitute their
own judgment for that of FERC.38 Despite FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction
over determining whether a rate is just and reasonable, FERC does not
have an affirmative duty to actually determine whether a filed rate is just
and reasonable.39 Instead, filed rates are presumed to be just and
reasonable, and thus lawful, unless challenged on a party’s request or on
FERC’s own initiative.40

34. Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577.
35. See id. at 582 (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237
U.S. 94, 97 (1915)) (“This rule is undeniably strict, and it obviously may work
hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which has been adopted by
Congress . . . .”)).
36. See Miss. Power & Light v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 372
(1988); In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2004); In re Calpine Corp.,
337 B.R. 27, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
37. Miss. Power & Light, 487 U.S. at 375.
38. See id. (citing Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408 (1925))
(“There ‘can be no divided authority over interstate commerce . . . the acts of
Congress on that subject are supreme and exclusive.’”); In re Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968) (“A presumption of validity therefore
attaches to each exercise of the Commission’s expertise, and those who would
overturn the Commission’s judgment undertake ‘the heavy burden of making a
convincing showing that it is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its
consequence.’”); Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co., 341 U.S. at 251–52; In re Mirant, 378
F.3d at 518.
39. 18 C.F.R. § 35.4 (2021); see Gen. Motors Corp. v. FERC, 613 F.2d 939,
944 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 84 FERC ¶ 61,174 at p.
61,912 (1998).
40. Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 369–70 (1st Cir. 1988)
(quoting Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co., 341 U.S. at 248–52 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
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2. Mobile-Sierra Doctrine
As explained in greater detail below, filed rates can arise through a
unilateral tariff rate or a bilateral contractual rate. Although FERC
determines whether a filed rate is just and reasonable, FERC itself does
not establish or predetermine the rates arising out of contracts; the
contracts and rates therein are freely negotiated between private parties
and then subsequently filed with FERC.41 The Mobile-Sierra doctrine is a
judge-made rule based on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FPA,
which maintains that when parties enter into a freely negotiated contract,
FERC must presume the contract rate meets the just-and-reasonable
requirement of the FPA; that presumption may be overcome only upon a
showing of “serious[] harm to public interest.”42 This presumption of
reasonableness is premised on the belief that when two sophisticated
business parties enter into a contract, the ensuing negotiations will
presumptively lead to a just and reasonable price.43
This presumption, in conjunction with FERC’s inability to modify or
abrogate the terms of the filed rate absent serious harm to the public
interest, can result in unprofitable outcomes.44 In fact, FERC can mandate
that a party continue performance under the terms of a money-losing
contract.45 In Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., the
Court noted that although FERC is not at liberty to impose an unprofitable
rate, it does not necessarily follow that FERC may rescue a party from its
improvident bargain just because a party negotiated for an unprofitable
rate. Instead, the “sole concern of the Commission would seem to be
whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest—as
where it might impair the financial ability of the public utility to continue
its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly
41. In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 444 (6th Cir. 2019).
42. Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
Cnty., 554 U.S. 527 (2008); see also United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv.
Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956); FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
43. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 545 (quoting Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v.
FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479 (2002)).
44. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981); In re Calpine Corp.,
337 B.R. 27, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (“FERC may
not change a filed rate solely because the rate affords a public utility ‘less than a
fair return,’ because the purpose of the power given to the FERC is the protection
of the public interest, as distinguished from the private interests of the
utilities . . . .”)); In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 444 (citing Sierra, 350 U.S. at
355 (“[I]t is clear that a contract may not be said to be either ‘unjust’ or
‘unreasonable’ simply because it is unprofitable to the public utility.”)).
45. In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 443–44 (citing Sierra, 350 U.S. 348).
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discriminatory.”46 Accordingly, absent serious harm to the public, FERC
cannot find a freely negotiated contract rate to be unjust or unreasonable.47
B. The Bankruptcy Code
When a party to a FERC regulated contract petitions for bankruptcy,
a new set of laws comes into play—serving as the catalyst to the
jurisdictional turf war at issue.48 Congress enacted Title 11, Chapter 11 of
the United States Code so that failing businesses could restructure and
reorganize in an attempt to once again become successful.49 Congress
concluded that it would be better to rehabilitate a business and allow it to
continue providing jobs, satisfying debts, and producing profits than to
force it into liquidation.50 Accordingly, Congress granted comprehensive
jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to “deal efficiently and expeditiously
with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.”51
Congress enshrined the rules of bankruptcy in what is commonly
referred to as the Bankruptcy Code. It is worth noting that Congress
expressly gave district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
cases under title 11 to avoid constitutional issues.52 Additionally, the
district court has exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the debtor and
all property of the estate.53 However, if any act of Congress grants
exclusive jurisdiction to another court concerning a civil proceeding54

46. Id.; see also In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822
(1968) (“The regulatory system created by the [FPA] is premised on contractual
agreements voluntarily devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates
abrogation of these agreements only in circumstances of unequivocal public
necessity.”).
47. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 545–46.
48. See generally In re NRG Energy, Inc., No. 03-3754, 2003 WL 21507685
(S.D.N.Y June 30, 2003); In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004); In re
Calpine, 337 B.R. 27; In re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-6528, 2010 WL
4616243 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2010); In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d 431; In re PG&E
Corp., 603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019).
49. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 517 (citing United States v. Whitting Pools, Inc.,
462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983)).
50. Id.; see also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); 14
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1.01 (16th ed. 2020).
51. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 517 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S.
300, 308 (1995)).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
53. Id. § 1334(e).
54. 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 3.01 (16th ed. 2020):
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arising under title 11 or relating to cases under title 11, the district court
will have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.55 This broad grant of
authority means that even when Congress has granted another court
exclusive jurisdiction on a matter, it nonetheless intended that the matter
should first be brought to the bankruptcy court, regardless of any statute
to the contrary.56
As noted, jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases is granted to the district
courts.57 The words “bankruptcy court” and “bankruptcy judge” appear
nowhere in the statute conferring jurisdiction.58 Instead, bankruptcy courts
and judges constitute a “unit” of the district court.59 Once a petition for
bankruptcy is filed with the district court, an estate is automatically created
comprising of all property and legal and equitable interests of the
debtor60—including contracts—which the district court judge will then
procedurally refer to the bankruptcy judge.61 Following a referral, the
bankruptcy court, as a unit of the district court, likewise has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the case, as well as the property of the debtor
and estate.62 This conferred authority includes the power to “hear and
determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings under title 11.”63
When an individual debtor petitions for bankruptcy, the court appoints
a trustee, who must then act as a quasi-agent or fiduciary, making
decisions utilizing the business judgment rule on behalf of the debtor.64
For businesses, the court does not typically appoint a trustee; instead, the
[A]nything that occurs within a case is a proceeding. Thus, proceeding
here is used in the broadest sense, and would encompass what are now
called contested matters, adversary proceedings, and plenary actions
under bankruptcy law. It also includes any disputes related to
administrative matters in a bankruptcy case.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). It is unclear whether this jurisdictional split pertains
only to courts or to administrative bodies as well. See In re Calpine Corp., 337
B.R. 27, 34 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
56. 14 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 3.01 (16th ed. 2020).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
58. See id.
59. Id. § 151 (“[T]he bankruptcy judges . . . shall constitute a unit of the
district court to be known as the bankruptcy court . . . Each bankruptcy judge, as
a judicial officer of the district court, may exercise the authority conferred under
this chapter with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding . . . .”).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 541; see also Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc., v. Tempnology,
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (2019).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 157.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 157(b)(1).
64. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107.
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debtor company becomes what is known as a debtor-in-possession
(debtor).65 To further facilitate the process of restructuring and
rehabilitation, § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor of an
estate to assume or reject any executory contracts,66 subject to the court’s
approval67 and the enumerated exceptions.68 This power promotes the
basic purpose of restructuring, thus allowing a debtor to reject an onerous
contract that would otherwise prevent successful reorganization.69 In fact,
rejection is “vital” to a successful reorganization.70 Therefore, § 365(a)
allows a debtor to choose whether a particular contract is prudent or
beneficial to the estate moving forward.71 As § 365(g) of the Bankruptcy
Code and Supreme Court jurisprudence make clear, rejection of an
executory contract results in a breach of contract.72 The resulting breach is
deemed to have occurred at the time of the filing of the petition for
bankruptcy, thus giving the nonbreaching party a claim for damages as an
unsecured creditor.73
Conflicting with this ability to reject any contract, though, are the
aforementioned filed rate and Mobile-Sierra doctrines. On the one hand,
the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to reject any executory contract for
any economic purpose;74 yet, on the other hand, courts are prohibited from
collaterally attacking a filed rate that is subject to FERC’s exclusive
jurisdiction.75 These seemingly conflicting statutes of the Bankruptcy
65. Id. §§ 1101(1), 1107(a).
66. The statute does not define “executory contract,” but the courts indicate
that the legislative history surrounding the statute suggests that the term means a
contract “on which performance is due to some extent on both sides.” In re Mirant
Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 518 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004) (first quoting NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984); and then quoting Mission Prod. Holdings,
Inc., v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (2019)).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a); see also Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1658.
68. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 365.
69. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 518; see Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1658 for the
proposition that § 365(a) also allows a debtor to assume an executory contract to
continue performance and accept the benefits of the counterparty’s performance.
70. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528; In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 518.
71. Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1658; see also In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 520
(citing In re Topco, Inc., 894 F.2d 727, 741 (5th Cir. 1990) (“In effect, Section
365 allows debtors to pick and choose among their agreements and assume those
that benefit their estates and reject those that do not.”)).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g); Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. 1652.
73. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
74. Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1663.
75. See generally Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246 (1950).
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Code and FPA are at the heart of the ongoing jurisdictional turf war
between them.76 Adding further complication to the debate is the courts’
duty to give effect to both congressionally enacted sets of statutes.77
II. REJECTION OF AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT
As stated, the filed rate doctrine prohibits courts from collaterally
attacking a filed rate.78 Additionally, once a rate has been filed with FERC,
FERC itself is not permitted to modify or abrogate that filed rate unless it
seriously harms the public interest.79 Based on these doctrines, FERC
asserts that allowing a debtor to reject a filed rate contract in bankruptcy
is an impermissible collateral attack on the filed rate and allows a court to
do that which FERC itself cannot do.80 Therefore, the first step in resolving
this jurisdictional debate is understanding the effect of rejection in
bankruptcy and whether it gives rise to an impermissible collateral attack
on a filed rate.
A. Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC
In 2019, in a resounding majority opinion, the Supreme Court
addressed the scope and impact of Bankruptcy Code § 365(a).81 The case,
Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,82 dealt with the
scope of § 365(a) in the context of a trademark licensing agreement,
specifically, Mission’s exclusive right to distribute Tempnology’s product
and Mission’s non-exclusive right to use Tempnology’s trademark.83
Ultimately, Tempnology filed for bankruptcy and sought to reject its

76. See In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 442 (6th Cir. 2019); cf.
Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 580 (1981) (“It would surely be
inconsistent with [the FPA’s] congressional purpose to permit a state court to do
through a breach-of-contract action what the Commission itself may not do.”).
77. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Motrin v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)) (“The courts are not at liberty to pick and
choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of
co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”)).
78. Miss. Power & Light v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 375 (1988).
79. FPC v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 354–55 (1956).
80. See Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 580.
81. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc., v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652
(2019) (8–1 decision).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1657.

2022]

COMMENT

637

licensing agreement with Mission.84 The Court laid out some of the basic
rules of bankruptcy, stating that a petition for bankruptcy creates an estate
of the debtor’s assets and rights; that, in the context of a business, the estate
is administered by the debtor; and that § 365(a) permits a debtor to assume
or reject any executory contract based on whether the contract is a “good
deal” moving forward, and if it is not, the debtor can refuse continued
performance of its duties under such contract.85 Moreover, the Court
explained that § 365(g) declares that rejection of an executory contract
results in a breach of contract.86 Accordingly, the breach creates a prepetition claim of damages for the counterparty and places the claim with
the other unsecured creditors, all of whom will be paid from the assets of
the estate.87 As the Court noted, the counterparty, as an unsecured creditor,
will often only receive pennies on the dollar.88
The parties in Tempnology did not deny these rules; rather, the issue
was Tempnology’s misplaced belief that upon rejecting its licensing
agreement with Mission, it could also terminate Mission’s right to use the
license.89 Essentially, Tempnology believed that if it rejected the licensing
contract, then Mission would no longer be able to use the trademark. In
directly addressing the competing theories of what effect § 365(a) has on
a contract, the Court expressly rejected the interpretation that § 365(a)
results in rescission of the contract; instead, the Court held that “both
Section 365’s text and fundamental principles of bankruptcy law
command” that rejection is merely a breach of contract.90
The Court based its theory on the premise that although the
Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “breach,” like a breach of
contract outside of bankruptcy, a breach of contract during bankruptcy
does not terminate the rights of the nonbreaching party.91 To illustrate its
conclusion, the Court used an analogy to explain the effect of a breach of
contract outside of a bankruptcy setting between a photocopier dealer and
a lessee of the photocopier.92 The Court explained that the dealer leased
the photocopier to the lessee, while also agreeing to conduct a monthly
service, in consideration of a monthly fee.93 One day, the dealer quit
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1658.
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174.
Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1658.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1659.
Id. at 1661.
Id. at 1659 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995)).
Id. at 1662.
Id.
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servicing the photocopier, thereby breaching the contract.94 At this point,
the Court explained, the lessee has two options: it can continue using the
photocopier and sue for damages resulting from the breach of service, or
alternatively, it can quit using the photocopier altogether and sue for any
resulting damages.95 Contrary to what Tempnology believed, the Court
emphasized that the choice belongs to the lessee, not the breaching party;
the same is true in bankruptcy, as well.96 Therefore, although Tempnology
could reject its executory contract and halt the exclusive distribution
provision, it could not unilaterally withdraw Mission’s right to use the
trademark.
B. In re Mirant’s Application of § 365
The plain language interpretation of § 365(a) and § 365(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code, as espoused in Tempnology, is not novel or new.97 Long
before the Supreme Court decided Tempnology, the Fifth Circuit, in In re
Mirant, applied its interpretation of § 365(a) and § 365(g) to a FERC
regulated filed rate.98 The debtor, Mirant, claimed that its authority as a
debtor and the court’s statutory authority to authorize rejection allowed
Mirant to reject its purchase-power agreement subject to the court’s
approval.99 FERC objected, asserting that pursuant to the FPA, FERC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the modification or abrogation of a filed rate,
and therefore, the court was preempted from rejecting the agreement
because it would result in an unauthorized collateral attack on the filed
rate.100 As the Fifth Circuit correctly noted, though, § 365(g) speaks in
terms of breach, not modification, abrogation, or rescission.101 Subsequent
to a debtor’s rejection, the nonbreaching party receives a pre-petition claim
of damages, as an unsecured creditor, for damages equal to the amount of

94. Id.
95. Id. (citing R. LORD, 13 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:32, pp. 701–02
(4th ed. 2013) (“[W]hen a contract is breached in the course of performance, the
injured party may elect to continue the contract or refuse to perform further.”)).
96. Id. (“[M]ost important[ly], it means that assuming [the lessee] wants to
keep using the copier, the dealer cannot take it back.”).
97. See generally In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004).
98. See id.
99. Id. at 518.
100. Id. at 519 (citing Miss. Power & Light v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S.
354, 375 (1988)).
101. Id. (citing In re Cont’l Airlines, 981 F.2d 1450, 1459 (5th Cir. 1993)); see
also Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1662–65.
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damages stemming from the filed rate.102 Therefore, because damages
resulting from rejection will be calculated using the filed rate, rejection is
not an attack on the rate itself;103 the court is not imposing a new rate, nor
is it substituting its judgment as to the reasonableness of the rate for that
of FERC.104
C. Initial Application of the Tempnology Opinion
Due to the relative infancy of the Tempnology decision, there has yet
to be any definitive circuit court ruling on its application to FERC
regulated contracts, but naturally, it has been adopted and advanced by
both sides of the jurisdictional debate, with each arguing that the case

102. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 520; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g).
103. See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519–20 (“Presumably, a contract’s filed rate
will be a relevant factor to the bankruptcy estate when it makes [its] determination
[to reject] . . . [but] [a] debtor’s use of the filed rate as a criteria . . . does not
convert that rejection decision into a prohibited collateral attack on the filed
rate . . . .”); but see In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 32–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (for
the proposition that a change in the duration of a filed rate contract would be a
collateral attack to FERC’s jurisdiction) (citing In re Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968) (“The regulatory system created by the Act is
premised on contractual agreements voluntarily devised by the regulated
companies; it contemplates abrogation . . . only in circumstances of unequivocal
public necessity.”)). However, as the Supreme Court in Tempnology made clear,
rejection is not abrogation. See generally Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. 1652.
104. Compare In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519 (“It is clear that” the court has
authority to rule on a Section 365(a) motion to reject “so long as that rejection
does not constitute a challenge to that agreement’s filed rate.”), with Ark. La. Gas
Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) (The issue in this case revolved around a
“favored nations clause.” According to the contractual clause, if the natural gas
customer, Arkla, bought gas from another producer at a higher price, then the
seller would be allowed to increase its selling price to match that of the other.
Arkla bought natural gas from another producer at a higher rate, thus triggering
the favored nations clause. However, Arkla never paid the increased pay rate, so
petitioner sought damages for the difference in the amount it should have been
paid. The Court held that it was preempted by the NGA and could not award
damages based on a rate other than that which is filed with the Commission.), and
In re Calpine, 337 B.R. at 30–31 (finding that the district court was preempted
from rejecting a filed rate in bankruptcy because even though the agreement was
“the most financially burdensome” of them all because the debtor expressed that
it was “‘ready and willing to supply the same amount of power–but at competitive
market prices.’”).
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supports its position.105 First, there is disagreement regarding
Tempnology’s applicability concerning the statutory exceptions to
§ 365(a) rejection. Second, there is disagreement concerning whether the
general law surrounding filed rate obligations prevents a debtor from
rejecting the filed rate.
1. Exceptions to Rejection
The Bankruptcy Code does indeed carve out numerous exceptions to
§ 365(a) and (g).106 Yet, despite the multitudinous array of exceptions, the
Bankruptcy Code fails to include any exception for a FERC regulated
rate.107 Nevertheless, although FERC admits that § 365 does not expressly
carve out an exception to the general rule—that a debtor can reject any
executory contract—for FERC regulated contracts, it maintains that the
lack of a specific exception is not sufficient grounds for denying its
concurrent jurisdiction.108 FERC posits that, as Tempnology suggests,
Congress did not list “the full universe of exceptions,” but instead, enacted
exceptions to § 365(a) when necessary to reinforce or clarify that
contractual rights survive rejection.109 Therefore, FERC argues that the
lack of an exception is not dispositive.110
FERC’s assertion that the absence of a specific exception to rejection
does not in itself deny concurrent jurisdiction is misplaced.111 Although it
is true that there is no exception for trademark contracts, the Tempnology
Court found that the rights granted to a licensee cannot be unilaterally
withdrawn during a debtor’s rejection, but this is because of the
105. Compare In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019), with
In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 454 n.6 (6th Cir. 2019), and ETC
Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 171 FERC ¶ 61,248 (2020).
106. Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1662–65; In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 521–22;
see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(o) (commitments to a Federal depository regulatory
agency); id. § 1113 (collective bargaining agreements); id. § 1169 (railroad
leases); id. §§ 365(d), 1110 (aircraft leases); id. § 365(h)(1) (real property leases);
id. §§ 365(h)(2), (i) (timeshare interests); id. § 365(n) (intellectual property).
107. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 521; In re Extraction Oil & Gas, 622 B.R. 608,
614 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
108. ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at PP 20, 33 (2020)
(quoting Tempnology to explain that “the list of exceptions included in section
365 is ‘anything but’ a ‘neat, reticulated scheme of narrowly tailored
exceptions.”).
109. ETC Tiger Pipeline, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at PP 22–23; see also
Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1664.
110. ETC Tiger Pipeline, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at P 22.
111. Id.
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implications of rights and property of the estate, as described below, which
is not a concern when rejecting a filed rate. Instead, “[w]hen Congress
provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have
authority to create others. The proper inference . . . is that Congress
considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the
ones set forth.”112
Moreover, this lack of an exception for FERC regulated filed rates was
not a congressional oversight.113 As multiple bankruptcy courts have
noted, the numerous exceptions to § 365(a) and § 365(g) exemplify the
fact that Congress is capable of enacting special rules for special
circumstances.114 Further, the Supreme Court has noted that although the
general rule is that rejection results in a breach of contract, when a judicial
decision arose wherein the Court failed to properly interpret Congress’s
intent regarding the effect of rejection, “Congress sprang into action” and
codified an exception.115 Congress has now had over 16 years to respond
to the Fifth Circuit’s decision denying FERC’s exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction when rejecting filed rates,116 yet it has not done so. Moreover,
in 2005, the year following the Mirant decision, Congress materially
amended the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, it even amended § 365.117 By
withholding any exception for FERC or filed rates, Congress made itself
clear—it did not intend to limit a FERC regulated debtor’s ability to reject
a filed rate.118
112. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000).
113. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2004).
114. See In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019); In re
Extraction Oil & Gas, 622 B.R. 608, 614 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
115. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc., v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652,
1664 (2019); see, e.g., Lubrinzol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d
1043, 1045–48 (4th Cir. 1985) (where the Fourth Circuit held that rejection of an
executory contract involving a patent revoked the license to that patent; Congress
subsequently enacted § 365(n)); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
528–29 (1984) (where the Supreme Court held that a debtor may unilaterally
reject a collective bargaining contract because, if not, it would undermine a
debtor’s authority to rejectl Congress subsequently enacted § 1113).
116. See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511; see also In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp.,
945 F.3d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 2019) (“in the fourteen years since Mirant was decided
by the Fifth Circuit, Congress has not provided any exception to [a bankruptcy
court’s] rejection of regulated power contracts pursuant to Section 365(a).”).
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A), (d)(4).
118. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 521; In re PG&E, 603 B.R. 471 (quoting FCC
v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302 (2003) (“[W]here
Congress has intended to provide regulatory exceptions of the Bankruptcy Code,
it has done so clearly and expressly.”)).
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2. Generally-Applicable-Law Exception to Rejection
Additionally, FERC has quoted Tempnology to aver that although
rejection relieves a debtor of its future obligations and contractual duties,
it does not exempt the debtor “from all the burdens that generally
applicable law . . . imposes on parties.”119 According to FERC, filed rate
obligations exist independently of contractual obligations because they are
“public obligations that carry the force of law.”120 Because these public
obligations exist independently of private contractual obligations, FERC
argues that the obligations continue to bind the parties, regardless of a
breach.121 Therefore, according to FERC, because filed rates create a
public obligation, § 365(a) rejection does not relieve a debtor of the
burdens imposed by a rate obligation.122 Accordingly, it is FERC’s
position that the general law surrounding filed rates demands that FERC
review a debtor’s ability to cease performance on its filed rate
notwithstanding a rejection in bankruptcy.123
FERC is not alone in this position. In the months following
Tempnology, the Sixth Circuit, in In re FirstEnergy Solutions Corp.,
delivered an opinion on appeal from the bankruptcy court concerning the
rejection of a filed rate.124 In a footnote, the majority noted that several
appellants cited Tempnology for the proposition that rejection does not
necessarily relieve a debtor of all of its contractual duties.125 The court,
however, was not convinced that Tempnology was analogous to the case
under review and suggested the parties argue it on remand.126 Despite the
majority’s dismissive response to the appellants’ argument, the sole
dissenting judge concluded that filed rates are akin to de jure regulations,
and therefore, in a one-paragraph aside, declared that Tempnology

119. ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at P 27 (2020) (quoting
Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1665).
120. Id. at P 22.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at PP 19–27.
124. In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2019).
125. Id. at 454 n.16.
126. Id. FERC petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing, inter alia, that the
Sixth Circuit panel’s decision was at odds with Tempnology. Petition of Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission for Rehearing En Banc, In re FirstEnergy Sols.
Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir.2019) (No. 18-3787). In the response to the petition,
the Sixth Circuit denied rehearing and rejected FERC’s assertion.
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prohibits a debtor from evading its obligations arising from “generally
applicable law.”127
But in quoting Tempnology’s statement concerning rejection and its
relationship with “generally applicable law,” both FERC and the Sixth
Circuit dissenting judge left a subtle, yet vital, phrase out of the
sentence.128 The quote is properly read as: “Section 365 does not grant the
debtor an exception from all the burdens that generally applicable law—
whether involving contracts or trademarks—imposes on property
owners.”129 The importance of this phrase, “on property owners,” becomes
more apparent when considering the thrust of the Court’s reasoning.130 The
Court determined that Tempnology could not unilaterally withdraw
Mission’s right to use the trademark because “[t]he estate cannot possess
anything more than the debtor itself did outside bankruptcy.”131 This is
relevant because, as previously addressed, the Bankruptcy Code declares
that the filing of a petition for bankruptcy creates an estate comprising of
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”132 Therefore, Tempnology could not acquire
the right to its own trademark through bankruptcy because it did not have
that property right at the commencement of the bankruptcy case.133 Thus,
according to the Court, a rejection pursuant to § 365(a) must result in a
breach of contract, rather than contract rescission, to prevent a debtor from
recapturing interests it had given up.134
Whether it be a photocopier or a trademark, the Court’s rationale does
not extend to a filed rate in the way FERC urges; in fact, the rationale runs

127. In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 462–63 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
128. See ETC Tiger Pipeline, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at P 27 (quoting Mission
Prod. Holdings, Inc., v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1665 (2019)); In re
FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 462–63 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
129. Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1665–66 (emphasis added).
130. See Response to Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 10, In re FirstEnergy
Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-3787).
131. Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1663 (quoting a “bankruptcy scholar,” D.
BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 97 (6th ed. 2014), for the proposition that
“whatever ‘limitation[s] on the debtor’s property [apply] outside of bankruptcy[]
appl[y] inside of bankruptcy as well. A debtor’s property does not shrink by
happenstance of bankruptcy, but it does not expand, either.’”).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also Tempnology, 139 S. Ct.
at 1663.
133. See Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1663–66.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); see also Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1663.
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counter to FERC’s assertion.135 A FERC regulated debtor who seeks to
reject its filed rate through the proper channels of bankruptcy does not seek
to acquire what it had not previously possessed.136 Instead, the debtor
simply seeks to reject its performance on the contract. Both Mission and
Tempnology agreed, and the Court made clear, that Tempnology’s
performance on the contract could be rejected.137
Nevertheless, despite the clear language of the Bankruptcy Code
declaring that a debtor can reject any executory contract, that rejection
results in a breach of contract, and that there are no exceptions to the
rejection of a FERC regulated filed rate138—in addition to the Supreme
Court and Fifth Circuit affirming that § 365(a) and § 365(g) apply broadly
to any executory contract139—the FirstEnergy Sixth Circuit court began
its analysis by stating that an analogy to a breach of contract outside of
bankruptcy would be inappropriate.140 Assuming arguendo that the
FirstEnergy court was correct in that Tempnology was an inapt analogy to
a FERC regulated rate, then the crux of the issue comes down to the
contentious analysis of whether a filed rate is a “simple run-of-the-mill”

135. See Response to Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 12, In re FirstEnergy
Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-3787).
136. See generally In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 621 B.R. 188, 197–98 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2020).
137. See Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1658–59 (The Court explained that
Tempnology sought to reject its executory contract, and the bankruptcy court
approved it. This meant “two things on which the parties agree. First, Tempnology
could stop performing under the contract. And second, Mission could assert (for
whatever it might be worth) a pre-petition claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for
damages resulting from Tempnology’s nonperformance. But Tempnology
thought still another consequence ensued.”); see also id. at 1662 (“The debtor can
stop performing its remaining obligations under the agreement. But the debtor
cannot rescind the license already conveyed.”).
138. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), (g).
139. Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1662.
140. In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 442 (6th Cir. 2019); see also
In re Calpine, 337 B.R. 27, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citation omitted):
It is of no moment that rejection in the bankruptcy court constitutes a
breach. Calpine . . . argue[s] bankruptcy courts have a broad power to
reject executory contracts, rejection constitutes breach, FERC has
exclusive jurisdiction over approval, modification, or termination of
wholesale energy contracts, not over breaches, and as such rejection is
outside of FERC’s jurisdiction. The elegance of this argument is
betrayed by the fact that the ‘breach’ here does not create a typical
dispute over the terms of a contract, but the unilateral termination of a
regulatory obligation.
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contract subject to rejection, or whether it is a de jure regulation that
carries the force of law.141
III. COURTS’ VARYING APPROACHES TO REJECTION OF A FILED RATE
Because the Supreme Court has held that FERC can compel
performance on a money-losing contract142 and on a contract that violates
anti-trust laws,143 in addition to general rules of FERC’s exclusive
jurisdiction pursuant to the filed rate doctrine, some courts, and FERC,
have inferred that a filed rate should be treated as a federal regulatory
statute that carries the force of law.144 In light of the fact that “[s]everal
courts have read the FPA and Bankruptcy Code in pari materia and
reached different conclusions,”145 it is necessary to provide a brief
overview describing the varying courts’ interpretations of the two.
A. Southern District of New York Analysis
In 2003, after two days of hearings, the bankruptcy court in In re NRG
Energy, Inc. found that the money-losing character of NRG’s filed rate
contract satisfied the business judgment rule, and therefore the court
approved NRG’s rejection of the filed rate contract pursuant to § 365(a).146
Despite this, the bankruptcy court refused to enjoin FERC or vacate its
order demanding continued performance, which NRG then appealed to the
district court.147 Subsequently, FERC issued a second order requiring
continued performance until it could determine whether termination of the
contract was consistent with the public interest pursuant to FERC’s
regulatory responsibilities.148
On appeal, the Southern District of New York rejected NRG’s
argument that the matter was merely a bankruptcy case and disputed the
financial arrangement.149 Instead, the court concluded that the contract was
141. See, e.g., In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019).
142. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
143. Penn. Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 343 U.S. 414, 422 (1952).
144. In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 444 (citing Nw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Mont.Dakota Utils. Co., 181 F.2d 19, 22–23 (8th Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 246 (1951));
see also Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 372 (1st Cir. 1988).
145. NextEra Energy, Inc., 166 FERC ¶ 61,049 at P 23 (2019), vacated, PG&E
v. FERC, 829 F. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 2020).
146. In re NRG Energy, Inc., No. 03-3754, 2003 WL 21507685, at *2
(S.D.N.Y June 30, 2003).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *3.
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a wholesale power contract and therefore within FERC’s exclusive
jurisdiction in accordance with the FPA.150 Additionally, the district court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the FPA states that only a
federal court of appeals can review FERC actions.151
A few years later, in 2006, the same district court judge who authored
the NRG opinion presided over In re Calpine.152 The judge noted the
opposing policies and rules between the filed rate doctrine and the
Bankruptcy Code, but concluded that “where there is conflict, the power
of the bankruptcy court must yield to that of the federal agency.”153
Additionally, the judge stated that “[i]t is of no moment that rejection in
the bankruptcy court constitutes a breach[]” because a FERC regulated
purchase power agreement is not “a run-of-the-mill contract”;154 it is a
regulatory obligation. Accordingly, the district court held that it lacked
jurisdiction to reject the contract because rejection would infringe on
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction over the rates and terms of a filed rate.155
The same court, under a different judge than the two prior cases,
slightly altered its analysis in In re Boston Generating, LLC.156 This case
is unique in that both the debtor and the counterparty agreed that the debtor
should seek FERC’s approval to reject the contract.157 Additionally, both
agreed that if FERC approved the rejection, the bankruptcy court could
determine whether it would approve the rejection.158 The parties disagreed,
however, as to whether FERC’s approval was a condition precedent or
whether such determinations could be made concurrently.159 Ultimately,
the district court concluded that the disagreement was immaterial because
rejection would be prohibited without the approval of both FERC and the
bankruptcy court.160

150. Id.
151. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 825(b).
152. In re Calpine, 337 B.R. 27, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
153. Id. at 34.
154. Id. at 36.
155. Id.
156. See In re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-6528, 2010 WL 4616243
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2010).
157. Id. at *2–3.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Under the analysis adopted by the Southern District of New York, one
thing is certain: FERC’s approval of rejection is necessary.161 In
accordance with NRG and Calpine, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction
regarding whether a party to a filed rate contract can reject said contract in
bankruptcy and whether performance thereon can be terminated.162
Pursuant to In re Boston Generating, LLC, though, FERC and the courts
have concurrent jurisdiction, wherein a debtor’s ability to successfully
reject a filed rate is necessarily dependent upon congruous outcomes from
both FERC and the court.163
B. Fifth Circuit Analysis
In 2004, the Fifth Circuit, in Mirant, was the first circuit court to
address this jurisdictional debate.164 Therein, the court acknowledged that
FERC does in fact have exclusive jurisdiction over determining whether
filed rates are just and reasonable.165 It further acknowledged that pursuant
to the filed rate doctrine, courts may not collaterally attack a FERC
approved rate by imposing a rate other than the rate FERC has approved.166
Nevertheless, the court emphasized that FERC does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over a breach of contract outside of bankruptcy and therefore
reasoned that FERC’s jurisdiction is only implicated if rejection
challenges the filed rate.167 Relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, the court
concluded that the FPA did not preempt the court so long as damages were
calculated using the filed rate and so long as the effects only indirectly
affected the filed rate.168
More recently, in 2020, a Texas bankruptcy court in In re Ultra
Petroleum Corporation abided by Mirant’s precedent and held that
FERC’s regulatory involvement with filed rate contracts did not create an
exception to rejection169 and noted that the court was not authorized to

161. See generally In re NRG Energy, Inc., No. 03-3754, 2003 WL 21507685
(S.D.N.Y June 30, 2003); In re Calpine, 337 B.R. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Boston Generating, LLC, 2010 WL 4616243.
162. See NRG Energy, 2003 WL 21507685, at *2; In re Calpine, 337 B.R. at 36.
163. See In re Boston Generating, LLC, 2010 WL 4616243, at *2–3.
164. See generally In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2004).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 519.
168. Id. at 519–20 (citing Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ala. Power Co., 824 F.2d
1465 (5th Cir. 1987)).
169. In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 621 B.R. 188, 197–98 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2020).
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create such an exception.170 Supporting its position, the court noted, as did
Mirant, that rejection is merely a breach of contract and that the contract
could have been breached just as easily outside of bankruptcy.171 Because
the debtor would not recapture any rights that it did not have prior to
bankruptcy, rejection was appropriate.172
C. Sixth Circuit Analysis
In 2019, the Sixth Circuit in FirstEnergy directly addressed the tension
between the FPA and Bankruptcy Code concerning whether a filed rate
carries the independent force of law, external to that of the contract.173 In
reviewing the bankruptcy court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit rebuked the
bankruptcy court’s approach, stating that the bankruptcy court
presupposed that it had exclusive jurisdiction and that the contracts were
ordinary contracts.174 The majority noted that the bankruptcy court treated
the filed rate contracts at issue as ordinary contracts subject to rejection,
“which it could not do with a regulation or statute and which would appear
to be contrary to [the Mobile-]Sierra [doctrine] and Pennsylvania
Water.”175 Nevertheless, although the split panel ultimately held that the
bankruptcy court has concurrent jurisdiction with FERC, it found the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to be primary or superior because
bankruptcy creates an “unequivocal public necessity,” thus overcoming
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.176 Accordingly, the majority concluded that,
based on the particular facts of the case, the filed rate contracts were
merely executory contracts subject to rejection, not de jure regulations.177
Conversely, the dissenting judge argued that precedent “makes clear”
that FERC’s authority to compel performance stems not from the law of
private contracts but, rather, from its statutory authority.178 The dissenting
judge also stated that the majority reached its conclusion based on a flawed

170. Id.
171. Id. at 204.
172. See id.
173. In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2019); cf In re
Calpine, 337 B.R. 27, 33–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (for the proposition that the duty to
perform on a filed rate derives not from private contract but from FERC itself).
174. In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 441.
175. Id. at 445 (emphasis omitted) (citing Sierra and Pennsylvania Water to
contend that “FERC can compel performance of money-losing contracts and
illegal contracts, respectively.”).
176. Id. at 446.
177. Id. at 445–46.
178. Id. at 445 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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understanding of how filed rates operate under the FPA and instead
averred that filed rates carry an independent legal obligation.179
Accordingly, to give effect to both the FPA and Bankruptcy Code, he
urged that the debtor must seek approval to reject from both FERC and the
bankruptcy court.180
D. Conflicting Analyses
As outlined above, the methods in which courts approach the issue of
rejecting a filed rate vary. The Fifth Circuit Mirant court focused on the
effect of rejection and whether rejection violates the filed rate doctrine as
an impermissible collateral attack, whereas the Southern District of New
York Calpine court and the Sixth Circuit FirstEnergy court addressed
whether a filed rate is merely a contract or a de jure regulation that carries
the force of law. Despite the fact that Mirant was decided two years before
Calpine, and despite the fact that the Mirant court found that rejection did
not directly interfere with FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction, the Calpine court
declined to adopt Mirant’s rationale.181
One reason the Calpine court declined to extend Mirant to the
situation was because the two cases were materially distinguishable.182 In
Mirant, the Fifth Circuit determined that rejection did not result in a
collateral attack upon FERC’s authority because Mirant did not need the
electricity it was purchasing in order to fulfill its obligations to supply
electricity to its customers.183 Thus, rather than merely seeking to reject
the contract due to excessive prices, Mirant sought to reject the contract
because it did not need the electricity at all; therefore, the Fifth Circuit
found that rejection did not result in a collateral attack.184
That was not the case, however, in Calpine.185 There, the debtor sought
“rejection based on dissatisfaction with the rates”186 but was “ready and
willing to supply the same amount” of electricity “at competitive market
prices.”187 As the Calpine court noted, “[t]he only thing separating
Mirant’s rejection . . . from being an unlawful collateral attack on the

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 459 (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In re Calpine, 337 B.R. 27, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 37–38.
In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 519–20.
In re Calpine, 337 B.R. at 36–38.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
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[filed] rate was the fact that [Mirant] did not want the energy at all.”188
Therefore, even if the Calpine court had adopted Mirant, based on the facts
of the case, the court could not have authorized rejection.
Second, and more importantly, the Calpine court did not adopt
Mirant’s rationale of authorizing rejection because it believed it lacked
jurisdiction; authorizing rejection “would directly interfere with FERC’s
jurisdiction over the . . . duration” of the contract, which could not
otherwise be accomplished outside of FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction, thus
constituting a collateral attack.189 Further, the court stated that it was
immaterial that rejection in bankruptcy constitutes a breach because
rejection of a filed rate was not a typical breach, but rather a “unilateral
termination of a regulatory obligation.”190 This was also the position of the
dissenting judge in FirstEnergy.
IV. FILED RATES: SUBJECT TO REJECTION OR DE JURE REGULATION?
Similar to the Calpine and FirstEnergy dissenting opinions, FERC
asserts that once a rate has been filed, that contract “become[s] the
equivalent of a federal regulation, imposing obligations on the parties that
extend beyond private contract law.”191 Because FERC believes that filed
rates “implicate the public interest and . . . carry the force of law,” it asserts
that it is “statutorily obligated and exclusively authorized to consider” the
abrogation or modification of such rates.192 Accordingly, this Part will
specifically address FERC’s statutory authority, as well as two cases
frequently cited for the assertion that once a rate has been filed, that rate
gives rise to a public obligation distinct from the underlying contract, thus
necessitating FERC’s approval before a public utility can abandon its
performance thereon.
A. FERC’s Statutory Authority
FERC uses §§ 205 and 206 of the FPA to support its position that a
public utility cannot abandon service under a filed rate without prior

188. Id. at 38.
189. Id. at 36.
190. Id.
191. ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at P 26 (2020) (quoting
NextEra, Inc., 167 FERC ¶ 61,096 at P 22 (Rehearing Order) (2019) (internal
quotations omitted)).
192. Id. at P 20.
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approval.193 Section 205(c) requires that every public utility file a schedule
“showing all rates and charges” as well as any contract that “affect[s] or
relate[s] to such rates, charges, classifications, or services.”194 This is
required for both initial schedule filings and changes thereon.195 The filing
of an initial schedule will take effect automatically and immediately.196
Conversely, the filing of a schedule change requires a notice period.197
Accordingly, § 205(d) states that “no change shall be made . . . in any such
rate . . . or service . . . or contract relating thereto, except after sixty days’
notice.”198 Upon notification of a schedule change, § 205(e) allows FERC
to conduct a hearing and issue an order regarding the lawfulness of such
change.199 FERC interprets § 205’s change-in-service notice requirement
to include “[c]ancellation or notice of termination.”200 Accordingly, a
public utility wishing to reject its filed rate and cease performance thereon
must satisfy the notice and approval requirements of § 205(d) and
§ 205(e).201
Pursuant to § 206(a), FERC is authorized to determine whether a rate,
charge, or classification, or contract relating thereto, is just and
reasonable.202 If FERC determines that a “rate, charge, classification, rule,
regulation, [or] practice” is unjust and unreasonable, it is authorized to “fix
the same” “to be thereafter observed and in force.”203 Unlike § 205, § 206
does not list “service” as an item subject to FERC’s determination.204
B. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission
Advocates arguing that filed rates carry the force of law rely, in part,
on the Supreme Court case Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal

193. Floyd L. Norton IV & Mark R. Spivak, The Wholesale Service Obligation
of Electric Utilities, 6 ENERGY L.J. 179, 187 (1985); see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d,
824e.
194. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c).
195. Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 368 (1st Cir. 1988).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d).
199. Id. § 824d(e).
200. 18 C.F.R. § 2.4(c)(4) (2021).
201. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 12 FERC ¶ 61,007 at p. 61,015 (1980).
202. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).
203. Id.
204. Norton & Spivak, supra note 193, at 188; compare 16 U.S.C. § 824d,
with 16 U.S.C. § 824e.
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Power Commission (Penn Water).205 In Penn Water, the contractual
parties petitioned the Commission to investigate Pennsylvania Water’s
allegedly excessive rates.206 The Commission found that Pennsylvania
Water had been charging its customers almost thrice what it should have
been charging, and pursuant to its authority, the Commission ordered the
filing of a new, lawful rate.207 The Commission likewise rejected
Pennsylvania Water’s subsequently filed rate and instead imposed a rate
of its own.208 Pennsylvania Water then appealed the Commission’s order
requiring a new rate.209
During the pendency of this appeal, in a separate lawsuit, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the underlying contract between
Pennsylvania Water and one of its customers, Consolidated, subjected
Pennsylvania Water to the control of Consolidated in violation of the
Sherman Act.210 Based on this Fourth Circuit decision, Pennsylvania
Water argued to the Supreme Court on its other appeal, Penn Water, that
the Commission could not require continued performance with the newly
imposed rate on an otherwise illegal contract.211 The Court, however,
disagreed and concluded that the Commission could require that
Pennsylvania Water continue performance notwithstanding the fact that
the Fourth Circuit had found some of the underlying provisions to be in
violation of anti-trust law.212 This is because, according to the Court, the
duty to perform “springs from the Commission’s authority, not from the
law of private contracts.”213 Based on this, FERC and like-minded courts
205. See e.g., In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 456–57 (6th Cir.
2019) (Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to Penn
Water as “instructive”); In re Calpine, 337 B.R. 27, 36–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(Although the court cited Penn Water to state that once a rate is filed, “the FPA,
not contract law, controls,” this case should be given little credence because the
debtor in this case sought to reject the filed rate contract solely because it was
dissatisfied with the rate—“thus constituting a collateral attack.”); ETC Tiger
Pipeline, LLC, 171 FERC ¶ 61,248 at P 22 (2020).
206. Penn. Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 416
(1952).
207. Id. at 416–17.
208. Id. at 417.
209. Penn. Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 193 F.2d 230 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
210. Penn. Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 421.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 422–23; see also Sunray Mid-Con. Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137,
155 (1960) (“The obligation that petitioner will be under after the contract term
will not be one imposed by contract but by the [NGA].”).
213. Penn. Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422–23.
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assert that FERC’s authority to compel performance on a filed rate,
notwithstanding rejection, is independent of and distinct from any
obligation based on a contract alone.214
But Penn Water does not create the categorical proposition that a filed
rate creates a de jure obligation subject to FERC’s demand of specific
performance.215 Moreover, it does not support the belief that FERC can
compel performance in every situation.216 In fact, the Court declined to
address “what, if any, power the Commission has . . . to compel parties to
carry out” an otherwise illegal contract because the Commission had not
exercised such power.217 Instead, the Court based its conclusion on the
facts of the case under §§ 206 and 202 of the FPA.218
As outlined above, § 206 authorizes FERC to prescribe and impose a
new, lawful rate upon determining that the rate in place is unlawful.219 This
allowed the Commission to impose a new rate after finding Pennsylvania
Water’s existing rate to be three times that of a just and reasonable rate.
Further, § 202 enables FERC to compel interconnection and coordination
of utility facilities and to “prescribe the terms and conditions of the
arrangement to be made between the persons affected.”220 This, in turn,
allowed the Commission to compel continued coordination. In
conjunction, these statutes gave the Commission ample statutory authority
to compel Penn Water and Consolidated to continue their long-existing
operational practice of integrating their power output.221 However, § 206
alone does not authorize FERC to compel performance. Therefore, absent
214. See In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 457 (6th Cir. 2019)
(Griffin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Blumenthal v. NRG Power
Mktg., Inc., 104 FERC ¶ 61,211, at p. ¶ 61,743 (2003); In re Calpine, 337 B.R.
27, 33 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
215. See Response to Petitions for Rehearing En Banc at 7, In re FirstEnergy
Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir.2019) (No. 18-3787).
216. See Norton & Spivak, supra note 193, at 191–95.
217. Penn. Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 421; cf. Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co.
v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 253 (1951) (“We need not decide what action
the Commission is empowered to take if it believes that a fraud has been
committed on itself, for it has taken no action which gives rise to or affects this
controversy.”).
218. Penn. Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422–23.
219. Id.; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353
(1956) (“The Commission has undoubted power under s[ection] 206(a) to
prescribe a change in contract rates whenever it determines such rates to be
unlawful. . . . [T]his power is limited to prescribing the rate ‘to be thereafter
observed’ . . . .”).
220. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b).
221. Penn. Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422.
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facts that indicate the coordination of facilities, FERC does not have the
authority to compel a debtor’s continued performance on a filed rate.222
C. Northwestern Public Service Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co.
Additionally, those supporting the position that a filed rate amounts to
a de jure regulation quote the Eighth Circuit to declare that once a rate has
been filed, that rate “is to be treated as though it were a statute.”223 But this
selectively chosen quote misconstrues the true meaning of that case.224 In
Northwestern Public Service Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. (MDU
I), Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. (MDU) alleged that it was being charged
unreasonably high rates, that it had a statutory right to just and reasonable
rates, and that it was therefore entitled to reparations.225 The district court
agreed, ruling in favor of MDU; however, the Eighth Circuit reversed.226
The Eighth Circuit found that filed rates, as understood under the
analogous Interstate Commerce Act, vest the Commission with the
authority to determine the reasonableness of rates.227 From this premise,
the court stated that once a rate has been filed, it is “the lawful rate[] until
changed in the way provided by the [FPA].”228 Therefore, although MDU
believed it had been charged an unreasonable rate, the court would not
impede on the Commission’s authority by imposing reparations on a
Commission-approved rate because the determination of reasonableness
is a matter of administrative function.229 Accordingly, “[s]o long as the
filed rate is not changed in the manner provided by the [FPA] it is to be
222. However, § 207 also allows FERC to compel performance if a public
utility’s service is inadequate or insufficient. See 16 U.S.C. § 824f.
223. In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 458 (Griffin, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Nw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Mont.-Dakota Utils.
Co., 181 F.2d 19, 22 (8th Cir. 1950)).
224. Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 563 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 791 n.60 (1968) (“The Commission’s
exercise of its regulatory authority must be assessed in light of its purposes and
consequences, and not by references to isolated phrases from previous cases.”)).
225. Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co., 181 F.2d at 20-22.
226. Id. at 22–23.
227. The Eighth Circuit stated that the FPA’s filed rate requirements are
analogous to the Interstate Commerce Act’s (ICA) similar filed rate requirements
and that cases from the ICA are controlling for the FPA as well. Therefore, “[t]he
rates filed and approved by the Commission are the lawful rates until changed in
the way provided by the Act.” Id. at 22.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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treated as though it were a statute, binding upon the seller and the
purchaser alike.”230
With this context, the partial use of a quotation from the Eighth Circuit
for the assertion that filed rates are akin to de jure regulations is inapt and
misleading.231 The court was not categorically declaring that, in general,
the filed rate was in fact a de jure regulation; it merely declared that a party
to a FERC regulated contract could not circumvent the purview of FERC’s
authority by demanding a different rate in a court of law than that which
is filed with FERC.232
This interpretation is further supported by the Supreme Court’s
opinion on appeal (MDU II).233 Affirming the Eighth Circuit, the Court
noted that “[a party] cannot litigate . . . its general right to a reasonable
rate, ignoring the qualification that it shall be made specific only by
exercise of the Commission's judgment, in which there is . . .
considerable . . . discretion.”234 In light of this reasoning, the Court held
that “the right to a reasonable rate is the right to the rate which the
Commission files or fixes”; thus, “the courts can assume no right to a
different [rate] on the ground that, in its opinion, [the different rate] is the
only or the more reasonable one.”235
Viewed in conjunction and with the proper context, MDU I and
MDU II merely give rise to the filed rate doctrine and prevent a court from
imposing a rate other than that which has been filed with FERC. The cases
do not, as some assert, create a categorical rule that filed rates are in all
respects to be treated as a statute.
D. A Filed Rate Is Not (Always) Akin to a De Jure Regulation
In the sense that courts are prohibited from awarding damages based
on a rate other than that which is filed with FERC, or from imposing a new
rate, the filed rate is indeed akin to a de jure regulation.236 Allowing courts
to base damages on a rate other than that which has been filed with FERC
would undermine the congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation and
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. See id. at 22–23.
232. See id.; cf. Penn. Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 343 U.S.
414, 423–24 (1952) (stating that Pennsylvania Water could not use the Sherman
Act in an attempt to nullify a Commission imposed rate reduction).
233. See generally Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246 (1951).
234. Id. at 251.
235. Id. at 252–53.
236. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2004).
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permit a court to do that which FERC itself could not do.237 But that is not
what occurs in bankruptcy238 and is likely the reason why no circuit court
has found the filed rate doctrine to preclude a bankruptcy court from
rejecting a contract.239 The argument that rejection “alters the essential
terms and conditions of a contract that is also a filed rate”240
mischaracterizes the effect of rejection241 because damages resulting from
the rejection are calculated using the filed rate.242 Thus, rejection does not
result in a collateral attack on the filed rate.243 Even FERC itself has
acknowledged in the past that in bankruptcy, the filed rate doctrine is not
violated so long as damages are based on the filed rate.244
Although it is true that the nonbreaching party, as an unsecured
creditor, will likely only receive a fraction of the full amount owed, that is

237. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 579-80 (1981).
238. See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519–21.
239. See generally id. at 511; In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th
Cir. 2019); but see In re Calpine, 337 B.R. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
240. See ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 171 FERC ¶ 61,248 at P 23 (2020).
241. See In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., No. 18-50757, 2018 WL 2315916, at
*13 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 18, 2018) (holding that rejection and cessation of
performance does not “intrude on FERC’s jurisdiction over filed rates.”):
If Plaintiffs were solvent and simply stopped making payments under the
[contract] . . . the counterparties could not reasonably argue that
Plaintiffs had somehow modified or abrogated those agreements; they
would seek damages for the breaches of those contracts in court . . . under
the terms of the contracts as written. Those breaches would lead to
claims. If the Plaintiffs then filed bankruptcy, the claims would become
claims against the estate. Treatment of those claims are governed by the
Bankruptcy Code. . . . Rejection has exactly the same effect (breach) and
the same result (a claim against the estate).
242. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519.
243. Id.
244. See USGen New England, Inc., 118 FERC ¶ 61,172 at P 26 (2007):
[M]itigation does not change the filed rate; it only changes the net
amount owed as an equitable remedy for the breach of the contract.
Accordingly, while it is correct that the Bankruptcy Court had no
jurisdiction to use a rate other than the filed rate to determine damages,
that truism begs the question of whether the court was being asked to
change the filed rate or use a rate other than the filed rate when USGen
sought additional mitigation.
The Commission went on to note that mitigation damages would not violate the
filed rate doctrine because the damages “would be calculated starting with the
filed rates, and then subtracting revenues to be expected to be received.” Id.
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the nature of bankruptcy and a function of law.245 This fact likewise does
not serve as a collateral attack on the filed rate.246 FERC’s jurisdiction over
rates, terms, and conditions extends only to those things that directly affect
the filed rate.247 Though rejection undoubtedly affects the filed rate, the
effects are merely indirect because it is the Bankruptcy Code, not the court,
that provides the classifications and priority rankings of creditors.248
E. Priority of Claims
The Bankruptcy Code provides that when a debtor rejects an executory
contract under § 365, the nonbreaching party receives a pre-petition claim
for damages as an unsecured creditor.249 Claim, in this context, is defined
as a “right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance.”250
Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code envisions and has preemptively
addressed the result of rejection concerning future performance on
contracts.251 The ultimate result may not seem fair,252 but in balancing the
burdens and expectations of the debtor and its counterparties, Congress
carefully crafted the burdens a debtor may reject.253
Additionally, because the value of a bankrupt estate is limited, the
Bankruptcy Code also ranks the priority of creditors and other claimants
with an interest in the estate.254 Allowing FERC to compel performance
will place the filed rate counterparty in a better position than Congress

245. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 521 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1129); In re Extraction
Oil & Gas, 622 B.R. 608, 625 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) (“[T]o be clear, nothing is
affecting the rate charged – the Rejection Counterparties . . . file claims at the
rates approved by FERC and this Court is doing nothing to abrogate those
approved rates.”).
246. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519–20.
247. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766 (2016).
248. See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 520–21.
249. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(c)(2), 502(g)(1).
250. Id. § 101(5).
251. See Blumenthal v. NRG Power Mktg., Inc., 104 FERC ¶ 61,210 at P 3
(2003) (Brownell, Commissioner, dissenting) (stating that if a breach of contract
in bankruptcy can be resolved financially, the Commission should not interfere).
252. See In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 621 B.R. 188 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020)
(stating that bankruptcy does not need to be fair to the counterparty because it is
fair by requiring parties to share the burden).
253. See Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652,
1666 (2019).
254. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 1129.
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intended.255 In crafting the priority scheme of distribution, Congress had
the foresight to include possible future tort claims, environmental
damages, and a host of other potential future creditors.256 Yet, it did not
place a filed rate on a pedestal.257 Indeed, “Congress established the
bankruptcy waterfall of distribution, much like it created FERC, and
nothing in the Bankruptcy Code nor the FERC regulation excepts or
prioritizes either of the statutes.”258
Moreover, allowing a filed rate counterparty to receive priority status,
which will necessarily diminish the amount of recovery for similarly
situated unsecured creditors, runs counter to Congress’s intent and results
in discriminatory and preferential treatment259—which, ironically, is what
the FPA’s purpose seeks to prevent.260 But once again, Congress had the
foresight to curtail such preferential acts.261 As bankruptcy scholar and
United States Senator Elizabeth Warren explained:
The Code’s treatment of the debtor’s executory contracts
illustrates another distributional objective of bankruptcy: treating
creditors alike. . . . [If a debtor could not reject its contracts], some
contract creditors might be able to jump the priority queue and
extract payments in excess of their unsecured claims by forcing
performance on economically infeasible obligations. Instead . . .
[t]he requirement that unsecured creditors be classified together
and receive pro rata distributions is another attempt to create
creditors with similar characteristics alike.262
In sum, FERC’s statutory authority, subject to very limited
circumstances, does not extend to demanding specific performance on a
filed rate. Moreover, a close reading of Penn Water, MDU I, and MDU II
reveals that those cases do not create a categorical rule that filed rates in
all circumstances—and especially in bankruptcy—carry the force of law.
Thus, because a filed rate in a bankruptcy proceeding does not carry the
weight of a federal regulation, it is subject to rejection, which by operation
255. See Blumenthal, 104 FERC ¶ 61,210 at P 3 (Brownell, Commissioner,
dissenting).
256. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 786–87
(1987).
257. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 1129.
258. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, 622 B.R. 608, 625 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
259. Warren, supra note 256, at 785–87.
260. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); see also In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d
431, 446 (6th Cir. 2019).
261. See Warren, supra note 256, at 791.
262. Id.
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of the Bankruptcy Code results in a breach and a pre-petition claim for
damages.
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR REJECTION
Regardless of how the jurisdictional debate is settled, circuit courts
and FERC agree that a bankruptcy court at least has concurrent authority
to reject a contract.263 Proceeding from that premise, it is still necessary to
establish the court’s standard of review for determining whether rejection
is appropriate. When a party petitions for bankruptcy, the court will
typically base its decision to approve or disapprove rejection using the
deferential business judgment rule.264 Pursuant to that standard of review,
a court should presume that a debtor is making its decision to reject based
on a prudent, good faith belief that rejection is in the best interest of the
estate.265 Conversely, if a party to a filed rate petitions FERC to modify or
abrogate its rate, the party will have to overcome the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine. Under the Mobile-Sierra standard of review, a FERC regulated
party must demonstrate that modification or abrogation of the filed rate is
necessary in order to prevent serious harm to public interest.266
A. Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ Standard-of-Review Solutions
The Fifth Circuit in Mirant did not affirmatively state whether the
bankruptcy court has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction regarding
rejection.267 It did, however, hold that although FERC has exclusive
jurisdiction over filed rates, rejection does not result in a collateral attack
on the filed rate, and therefore the FPA does not preempt the bankruptcy
court.268 Additionally, the court acknowledged that the filed rate and
Mobile-Sierra doctrines prohibit FERC from altering a rate purely based
on private concerns of unprofitability, and, therefore, it would be
inappropriate to use the business judgment rule to consider rejection.269 On
263. See, e.g., In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004); In re FirstEnergy,
945 F.3d at 43; ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at P 33 (2020); but
see In re Calpine, 337 B.R. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
264. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc., v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652,
1668 (2019); In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 621 B.R. 188 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).
265. In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471,486 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019).
266. Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc., v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
Cnty., 554 U.S. 527 (2008).
267. See generally In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511.
268. Id. at 518.
269. Id. at 525.
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remand, the Fifth Circuit suggested in dicta that the bankruptcy court
should scrutinize whether to approve rejection utilizing a more stringent
standard than the business judgment rule.270 In reaching its conclusion, the
Fifth Circuit panel noted that FERC would be able to provide its input
because the bankruptcy court had already indicated that it would welcome
FERC’s participation.271 By stating that the court was not preempted and
that the bankruptcy court “should consider applying a more rigorous”
standard of review, it impliedly held the court’s authority to reject was
exclusive.272
On remand, the bankruptcy court denied rejection on other grounds
but nevertheless made its views on the proper standard of review known
for future purposes.273 The bankruptcy court in the Northern District of
Texas affirmatively adopted the Fifth Circuit’s suggestion and stated that
it would carefully scrutinize the impact of rejection on the public interest
and only allow rejection if it would not cause any disruption in the supply
of electricity or lead to unjust or unreasonable rates. If rejection would
result in such negative impacts on the public interest, the court would not
allow rejection unless the debtor could show that it could not reorganize
otherwise.274
In 2020, the Southern District of Texas likewise adopted, and applied,
Mirant’s suggestion as controlling.275 Over the course of a multi-day
hearing, the bankruptcy court heard expert testimony as to whether
rejection of a natural gas agreement would implicate the public interest.276
The court noted that neither party submitted evidence that rejection would
threaten public health, safety, or welfare, and therefore allowed
rejection.277
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit in FirstEnergy held that “the
public necessity of available and functional bankruptcy relief is generally
superior to the necessity of FERC’s having complete or exclusive
authority to regulate energy contracts,” and therefore, in choosing between
the competing necessities, it concluded that the bankruptcy court had
concurrent but “primary or superior” jurisdiction.278 To accommodate its

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id. at 525–26.
See id. at 525.
In re Mirant, 318 B.R. 100, 108 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004).
Id.
In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 621 B.R. 188, 199 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2020).
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431, 445–46 (6th Cir. 2019).
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holding of concurrent jurisdiction, on remand the Sixth Circuit required
that the bankruptcy court use a higher standard of review.279
Despite the difference between the two opinions concerning the
appropriate standard of review, the outcome, in effect, is the same.
Quoting Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit suggested that the
bankruptcy court adopt a standard that would approve of rejection only if
the debtor can show the contract “burdens the estate” and that “after
careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting” the contract.280
The Sixth Circuit quoted Mirant’s suggestion in making its holding.281
Thus, courts within the Fifth and Sixth circuits utilize a heightened
standard of review, but this standard is not as onerous as the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine.
B. FERC’s Use of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine as a Standard of Review
The public-interest standard of review of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
governs FERC’s determination as to whether a regulated party can modify
or abrogate its filed rate.282 Accordingly, FERC posits that the best way to
harmonize the FPA and Bankruptcy Code, rendering each of the respective
statutes effective, is to allow a debtor to reject a contract pursuant to
§ 365(a) using the business judgment rule and to allow FERC to assess,
and to veto if necessary, the rejection based on the Mobile-Sierra publicinterest standard.283 FERC asserts that this model of “concurrent”
jurisdiction allows a bankruptcy court to sit in judgment of rejection,
which is solely within the province of the bankruptcy court, while also
allowing FERC to exercise its sole province over filed rates.284
The FPA finds its roots in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA).285 Like
the ICA, the FPA requires regulated public utility companies to
unilaterally file tariffs with FERC, which will then serve as the rates and
terms of general applicability to any potential customer.286 Alternatively,
unlike the ICA, the FPA departed from a purely tariff-based scheme by
279. Id. at 454.
280. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 525 (5th Cir. 2004).
281. In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 454.
282. Rockies Express Pipeline LLC, 173 FERC ¶ 61,099 at P 34 (2020).
283. In re FirstEnergy, 945 F.3d at 451.
284. ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 171 FERC ¶ 61,248 at P 25 (2020).
285. Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 531 (2008).
286. Id.; see also Michael Keegan, Bargaining For Power: Resolving Open
Questions From NRG Power Marketing LLC v. Maine Public Utilities
Commission, 65 ME. L. REV. 99, 100 (2002).
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also allowing public utilities to set rates through bilateral contracts.287
Regardless of the method chosen, the rate must be filed with FERC, and
the rate must be just and reasonable.288 FERC can then choose to
investigate the rate or decline investigation, in which case the rate will go
into effect immediately.289 FERC, however, does not have an affirmative
duty to investigate.290 Nevertheless, FERC’s decision to decline
investigation does not deem a rate to be just and reasonable;291 FERC may
still challenge and replace an unlawful rate with a lawful rate at a later date
in response to a complaint or of its own volition.292
Under a traditional tariff-based review, FERC utilizes a cost-ofservice standard that ensures a seller recovers costs of service while
allowing sufficient profit to attract investors.293 Under a contract-based
review, though, a judicially created standard of review is utilized.294 In a
pair of cases decided on the same day, the Supreme Court declared that a
freely negotiated contract is presumptively just and reasonable, that a
bilateral contract rate may not be unilaterally modified or abrogated, and
that the just-and-reasonable presumption may only be overcome if it
seriously harms public interest.295 These twin cases gave rise to the socalled Mobile-Sierra doctrine.296
1. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.
In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., the Court
held that a party to a bilateral contract filed rate cannot unilaterally change
its rates.297 The case arose when United Gas unilaterally filed a new rate

287. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 531; United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile
Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338 (1956).
288. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(c).
289. Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 368 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting
Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 255–56 (1951)).
290. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e); 18 C.F.R.
§35.4 (2021).
291. 18 C.F.R. § 35.4 (2021).
292. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a)).
293. Id.
294. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332
(1956); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
295. Id.
296. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 532–33; but see id. at 551 n.6 (noting that
although Mobile and Sierra arose in 1956, the Supreme Court had not adopted the
phrase until 2008).
297. Mobile Gas Serv., 350 U.S. at 337.
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increase for a Commission-regulated contract rate.298 United Gas was
under the impression that the NGA allowed rate changes with 30-days’
notice to the Commission.299 The Court, however, disagreed, stating that
the Act merely provides a notice provision, not a rate-making procedure.300
Because the Act does not define rate-making and rate-changing powers,
“[t]he obvious implication” is that those powers are the same as those
absent the Act.301 Since a party cannot unilaterally change a contract rate
in general, a party cannot change a contract rate simply because it is
regulated. This in turn furthers the public interest by preserving the
integrity of contracts and creating stability in the industry.302 Additionally,
the Court noted that although a party may not unilaterally change a
contract rate to further its private interests, it was not precluded from
seeking relief if those interests align with the public interest.303
2. Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.
In Federal Power Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., the Court
built upon Mobile and held that because a party to a contract could not
unilaterally change its rate, the Commission likewise could not provide
relief to a party merely because it yielded less than a fair rate of return.304
The Commission had found that the contract rate at issue was
unreasonably low and therefore unlawful, and thus permitted the party to
unilaterally increase its rate.305 The Commission’s actions were justified
under the traditional cost-of-service standard of review; a less-than-fair
return would not have been just and reasonable, and thus would be subject
to modification or abrogation. But where parties enter into a freely
negotiated contract, the Court stated that the “sole concern” of the
Commission is whether the rate is “so low as to adversely affect the public
interest.”306 The Court then provided three nonexclusive factors on which

298. Id. at 336.
299. Id. at 339–41.
300. Id. at 341–43.
301. Id. at 343; cf. discussion supra Section II.A. describing the Tempnology
Court’s assertion that a breach of contract pursuant to § 365(a) and § 365(g) has
the same effect in bankruptcy as a breach of contract outside of bankruptcy.
302. Id. at 344.
303. Id.
304. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956).
305. Id. at 354–55.
306. Id. at 354–55; see also Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Publ Util. Dist.
No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 546–47 (2008) (“[I]n a proper regulatory
scheme, the ordinary mode for evaluating contractually set rates is to look to
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the Commission could make such a determination: if the rate (1) would
impair the public utility’s financial ability to continue service, (2) would
create an excessive burden for other customers, or (3) was unduly
discriminatory.307
This judicially created test arising out of Mobile and Sierra weighs
heavily in favor of contracts and significantly limits the Commission’s
authority to regulate rates arising out of contracts.308 As applied over the
years, this standard of review has since been described as “practically
insurmountable,”309 providing for abrogation only in “extraordinary
circumstances”310 of “unequivocal public necessity,”311 with a possibility
of overcoming that is “hardly worthy of recognition.”312 However, as
applied, this onerous standard for contract rates cannot be reconciled with
the plain language of the FPA.
C. The Mobile-Sierra Doctrine is Incompatible with the Goals of
Bankruptcy
Whether a rate is set unilaterally through tariff, or bilaterally through
contract, the rate must be just and reasonable.313 But the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine, as applied, creates a bifurcated analysis with no textual support
in the accompanying statutes.314 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that two standards of review exist; one for unilateral tariff rates based on
the statutory just-and-reasonable standard, and one for bilateral contract
rates based on the public-interest standard pursuant to the judge-made
Mobile-Sierra presumption.315 Yet, the Court has attempted to justify this
“obviously indefensible proposition that a standard different from the
statutory just-and-reasonable standard applies to contract rates” by
contending that the public-interest standard is simply a differing
whether the rates seriously harm the public interest, not to whether they are unfair
to one of the parties that voluntarily assented to the contract.”).
307. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 352.
308. Carmen L. Gentile, The Mobile-Sierra Rule: Its Illustrious Past and
Uncertain Future, 21 ENERGY L.J. 353, 362 (2000).
309. Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
310. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582 (1981).
311. In re Permian Basin, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968).
312. Papago Tribal Util. Auth., 723 F.2d at 954.
313. Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Publ Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 545 (2008) (“There is only one statutory standard for
assessing whether wholesale–electricity rates, whether set by contract or tariff—
the just-and-reasonable standard.”).
314. Id. at 556–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 534–35.
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application of the just-and-reasonable standard316 and that this publicinterest standard simply defines what it means to be just and reasonable in
the context of a contract.317 But this justification is unpersuasive.318
Under the Mobile-Sierra interpretation of the FPA, public utilities can
either (1) unilaterally file a tariff for prospective customers, which the
public utility can change at will, or (2) enter into a bilateral contract with
a specific customer, which can only be changed through mutual assent.319
Therefore, a tariff can be changed at will,320 but a contract, absent mutual
assent, can only be changed if it is shown to seriously harm the public
interest.321 Likewise, if FERC determines that a rate is not just and
reasonable, and is therefore unlawful, it may change a unilateral tariff rate;
but if a contract rate is determined to be unjust and unreasonable, FERC
must nonetheless presume that it is just and reasonable, abrogating the rate
316. Id. at 535; NRG Power Mktg. v. Me. Public Util. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165,
168 (2010).
317. NRG Power Mktg., 558 U.S. at 174 (quoting Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S.
at 546).
318. See Gentile, supra note 308, at 357 (“[W]ithout the Sierra requirement of
public interest findings, the same just and reasonable standard would apply to both
contract rate revisions and non-contract rate revisions.” Without such
requirements, “the Commission would be able to overturn contract rates as readily
as non-contract rates.”); id. at 368 (quoting Ne. Util. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d
937, 961 (1st Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted)) wherein the First Circuit
described FERC’s actions as
conflat[ing] the just and reasonable and public interest standards, thereby
circumventing the Mobile–Sierra doctrine. The distinction between the
just and reasonable standard and public interest standards loses its
meaning entirely if the Commission may modify a contract under the
public interest standard where it finds the contract may be unjust [or]
unreasonable.
319. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 343
(1956); see also NRG Power Mktg., 558 U.S. at 171–72.
320. Keegan, supra note 286, at 127:
Under a classic tariff scheme, customers do not negotiate with the utility
the rates of service. Instead, the customer must accept the rates set forth
in the tariff. The customer is protected because the regulatory agency,
such as FERC, has found that the rates listed in the tariff are just and
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory . . . . When the utility
determines that the rates in the tariff no longer provide it with a sufficient
return, the utility may unilaterally seek an increase by proposing a new
rate to FERC. The rate goes into effect automatically so long as FERC
does not find that the rate is not just and reasonable.
321. Mobile Gas Serv., 350 U.S. at 343; see also NRG Power Mktg., 558 U.S.
at 171–72.
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only if FERC determines that it seriously harms the public interest.322 This
heightened burden for contracts is not merely a differing application of the
just-and-reasonable standard—it is an “obviously indefensible” heightened
standard of review.323
Nevertheless, even if the public-interest standard is merely a different
application of the just-and-reasonable standard, the statute does not
provide for different applications of the just-and-reasonable standard of
review depending on whether it is a unilateral tariff or bilateral contract,
nor does it require a presumption of reasonableness.324 Congress chose the
broad language of “just and reasonable” to enable FERC to carry out its
purpose by filling in the gaps as it saw fit.325 Courts, however, have
restrained FERC’s ability to fulfill its duty by imposing restrictions despite
acknowledging that “just and reasonable” is incapable of precise judicial
definition, that administrative agencies should be granted significant
deference, and that FERC is not constrained by any one ratemaking
formula.326
322. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 548; see also id. at 565–66 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting various FERC orders to argue that even if the Mobile-Sierra
standard is a differing application of the just and reasonable standard, that is not
how FERC interprets it:
[I]f rates . . . become unjust and unreasonable and the contract at issue is
subject to the Mobile-Sierra standard of review, the Commission under
court precedent may not change the contract simply because it is no
longer just and reasonable . . . . [T]he Commission is bound to a higher
burden to support modification of such contracts.)
323. Id. at 557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
324. Id.
325. Id. at 557–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)).
326. Id. at 532, 558–59 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 568–69
(Stevens, J., dissenting):
The Court has curtailed the agency’s authority to interpret the terms “just
and reasonable” and thereby substantially narrowed FERC’s discretion
to protect the public interest by means it thinks best. Contrary to
Congressional intent, FERC no longer has the flexibility to adjust its
review of contractual rates to account for changing conditions in the
energy markets or among consumers.
In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968) (“The court’s
responsibility is not to supplant the Commission’s balance of these interests with
one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the Commission has
given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors.”); id. at 784
(“[A]dministrative authorities must be permitted, consistently with the obligations
of due process, to adapt their rules and policies to the demands of changing
circumstances.”).
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When considering the context in which the filed rate and MobileSierra doctrines arose, their continued application in the modern world is
without merit.327 Indeed, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine itself took the first
step toward deregulation.328 If a rate is created through a negotiated
contract, FERC has no power to regulate absent extraordinary
circumstances.329 Quite frankly, the doctrine protects contracts rather than
protecting consumers from unjust and unreasonable rates.330 This is even
more apparent when considering that just two years after Mobile was
decided, the Supreme Court effectively held that a party can contractually
draft out of the Mobile-Sierra presumption and unilaterally file a new rate
change.331 Courts of Appeals have taken this a step further, allowing
contracts to grant FERC the authority to abrogate a rate if that rate does
not provide a fair rate of return.332 As a result, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
has created an arena whereby deference to freedom of contract has made
FERC’s role subservient.333
This arena of contractual deference is premised on the belief that
preserving the integrity of contracts helps to maintain reasonable prices,
thus protecting the public interest.334 FERC has stated that “uncertainties
regarding rate stability and contract sanctity can have a chilling effect on
investments” and distribution.335 And that may be true. Investors will
likely feel more comfortable committing the necessary capital if they are
327. Maslin Indus., U.S., Inc., v. Primary Steel, Inc. 497 U.S. 116, 150–51
(1990) (Stevens, J., and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
328. Gentile, supra note 308, at 367.
329. See id. at 366–67.
330. Id. at 363; see In re Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 882; Morgan Stanley Cap.
Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527, 564 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
331. United Gas Pipe Line Co. vs. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358
U.S. 103, 110–13 (1958) (The Court noted that unlike in Mobile, the seller here
“bound itself to furnish gas . . . not at a single fixed rate . . . but at what in effect
amounted to its current ‘going’ rate.” As a result, the seller was contractually “free
to change its rates from time to time.” Under such circumstances, “there is nothing
in Mobile which suggests that [the seller] was not entitled to [unilaterally] file its
new schedules under” § 4(d) of the NGA).
332. See e.g., Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir.
1983); La. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 587 F.2d 671, 675–76 (5th Cir. 1979).
333. See NRG Power Mktg. v. Me. Public Util. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 180
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 559 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
334. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344
(1956); In re Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 822.
335. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 551.
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confident that FERC will not modify or abrogate a filed rate absent
extraordinary circumstances.336 However, this rationale does not extend to
bankruptcy; anyone who invests or extends credit assumes a risk of
nonpayment in bankruptcy, and such risk is adequately structured in
interest.337 Additionally, this “chilling effect” was further rebuffed in Ultra
Petroleum, wherein expert testimony revealed that from the time Mirant
was decided in 2004, $92 billion had been spent on building pipelines.338
This criticism of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is not absolute. Though
the doctrine may be flawed, this Comment does not seek to uproot the
doctrine’s longstanding interpretation.339 Rather, it contends that the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine should not apply in the context of bankruptcy
because it is “fundamentally at odds with the policies of flexibility and
equity built into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.”340
Because of the atextual, nearly insurmountable standard required to
prove that a contract rate seriously harms the public interest and is thus
worthy of modification or abrogation, parties may become overburdened
and projected into bankruptcy.341 If a debtor cannot reject its burdensome
contracts, efforts to successfully reorganize and emerge anew are thwarted
from the outset.342 In fact, FERC has found a debtor’s claims that
continued performance of a filed rate contract would preclude the debtor
from receiving necessary loans insufficient to overcome the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine when preclusion would result in liquidation.343 Only upon
liquidation could the debtor cease performance.344 But the Supreme Court
has expressly rejected a standard of review that merely asks whether
rejection is necessary to prevent a debtor from liquidating.345 Notably, the
Court stated that although such a heightened burden “may not be
insurmountable,” it nevertheless “interfere[s] with the reorganization

336. NRG Power Mktg., 558 U.S. at 174.
337. Warren, supra note 256, at 780.
338. See In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 621 B.R. 188, 203 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2020).
339. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 551 n.6 (explaining that although the
Supreme Court had not adopted the phrase “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” until 2008,
FERC and lower courts alike had been using the term for decades).
340. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 525 (1984).
341. See, e.g., In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2019).
342. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528; In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511,
518 (5th Cir. 2004).
343. See generally Blumenthal v. NRG Power Mktg., Inc., 104 FERC ¶ 61,210
(2003).
344. Id. at P 68 n.81.
345. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525.

2022]

COMMENT

669

process” and opposes the fundamental policies of the Bankruptcy Code.346
Thus, if the Court rejected a standard of review that “may not be
unsurmountable,”347 a fortiori, a standard of review that is described as
“practically insurmountable”348 must likewise be rejected. FERC is
inextricably bound to follow the practically insurmountable burden of the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine; accordingly, granting FERC concurrent
jurisdiction in matters concerning bankruptcy would interfere with the
reorganization process and be but a façade to matters of equity.349
VI. HARMONIZING THE FPA AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
When courts are confronted with two competing Acts of Congress,
they must attempt to interpret and harmonize the statutes in such a way as
to regard each as effective if the two are capable of co-existence.350 Despite
the numerous interpretations concerning this “imagined conflict,”351 the
FPA and Bankruptcy Code provide explicit instructions.352 Moreover, “[a]
party seeking to suggest that two statutes cannot be harmonized, and that
one displaces the other, bears the heavy burden of showing ‘a clearly
expressed congressional intention’ that such result should follow. The
intention must be clear and manifest.”353
A. Administrative Agency Deference
FERC’s solution—that it has concurrent jurisdiction with bankruptcy
courts—fails to harmonize the FPA with the Bankruptcy Code; it renders
rejection entirely ineffective, destroys a debtor’s rights under the
Bankruptcy Code, and supplants Congress’s will.354 Its idea of concurrent
346. Id. (The Court then went on to adopt a standard of review that allows a
court to reject a collective-bargaining agreement if, “after careful scrutiny, the
equities balance in favor of reject[ion] . . . .”).
347. Id.
348. Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
349. See generally Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of
Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 527 (2008); NRG Power Mktg. v. Me. Public Util.
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165 (2010).
350. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2004).
351. In re PG&E Corp., No. 19-30088, 2019 WL 2183380, at *3 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Mar. 1, 2019) (recommendation re motions to withdraw the reference).
352. Id.
353. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (quoting Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 (1995)).
354. In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., No. 18-50757, 2018 WL 2315916, at *13
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 18, 2018); In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 476 (Bankr.
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jurisdiction “is, at best, a costly procedural delay of the final determination
of the treatment rejection claims will receive in the bankruptcy case. At
worst, it is an inappropriate violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority
scheme.”355
As an administrative agency, courts must typically defer to FERC’s
interpretation of the FPA, including interpretations of its own statutory
authority.356 But granting FERC the ability to impede on a bankruptcy
court’s jurisdiction over the rejection of contracts “would allow the tail to
wag the Doberman.”357 “FERC is a creature of statute,” and unlike the
bankruptcy court, it has “no constitutional or common law existence or
authority, but only those authorities conferred upon it by Congress.”358 No
matter how hard or long FERC searches, it will not find authority in the
FPA or the Bankruptcy Code permitting such usurpation of authority.359
Instead, “Congress provided FERC limited regulatory jurisdiction over
interstate” transmission of electricity, “and this limited regulatory
jurisdiction is not a legitimate basis to usurp [a bankruptcy court’s]
authority to rule on [a] [d]ebtor’s motion to reject.”360

N.D. Cal. 2019); The FirstEnergy court was correct in rejecting this argument,
but the court was incorrect in basing its holding on the belief that “the public
necessity of available and functional bankruptcy relief is generally superior to the
necessity of FERC’s having complete or exclusive authority to regulate energy
contracts.” Instead, the court should have reached its conclusion based on the
statutory authority granted to bankruptcy courts and FERC. In re FirstEnergy
Sols. Corp., 945 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2019).
355. See FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 2018 WL 2315916, at *13.
356. Miss. Power & Light v. Miss ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380–81 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see generally Chevron USA v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (creating the so-called Chevron doctrine); but
see Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760–63 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that agency deference divests the judiciary of its constitutionally vested
authority).
357. See Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652,
1665 (2019).
358. See In re PG&E, 603 B.R. at 485; see also Warren, supra note 256, at
780 (noting that default, or nonpayment, has been an integral part of society dating
back to Biblical jubilees).
359. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2004); In re PG&E,
603 B.R. 471.
360. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, 622 B.R. 608, 625 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
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Additionally, FERC’s interpretation of its own jurisdictional authority
concerning both bankruptcy361 and general breach of contract claims362 has
been inconsistent, and, therefore, should not be granted any significant
deference in this jurisdictional debate.363 In 2002, FERC noted its longstanding policy of preserving the sanctity of contracts, departing from the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine “only in extreme circumstances, such as . . .
fundamental industry-wide restructuring . . . and the reorganization of a
bankrupt utility.”364 But in 2003, in NRG, FERC addressed whether a
debtor must continue to fulfill its service notwithstanding rejection and
stated that although the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to reject a
contract subject to the court’s approval, “the utility still must meet its
obligations under the FPA.”365
The following year, in Mirant, FERC argued that the FPA preempted
courts from rejecting a FERC regulated contract because rejection resulted
in an unauthorized collateral attack on the filed rate.366 The Fifth Circuit
disagreed, and instead determined that the bankruptcy court had both the
361. See, e.g., Cal. Elec. Oversight Bd., 114 FERC ¶ 61,003 (2006) (noting
that FERC adopted the Fifth Circuit In re Mirant decision and that “the
Commission is precluded from taking action under the FPA that impacts a
debtor’s ability to reject an executory contract.”); ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172
FERC ¶ 61,155 at P 32 (FERC noted that “[i]n applying these [Arkla] factors to
specific cases involving bankruptcy, the Commission has reached different
conclusions.”); ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 P 16 nn.37–38;
Transwestern Pipeline Co., 103 FERC ¶ 61,066 at P 11 (2003); N. Nat. Gas Co.,
102 FERC ¶ 61,076 at P 71 (2003)); Kern River Gas Transmission Co., 101 FERC
¶ 61,374, at p. 62,556 (2002) (“[B]ecause [the contract] was an executory contract
. . . [Enron had] the right to determine, at its sole discretion, whether to reject” or
assume the contract.).
362. See, e.g., S. Md. Elec. Coop. v. J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corp., 155
FERC ¶ 61,164 P 23 (2016); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 150 FERC ¶ 61,091 at P 10
(2015); see also, e.g., In re Enron Power Mktg. Inc., No. 01-7964, 2003 WL
68036, at *5, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2003); Masspower ex rel. BP MP Partners I,
LLC v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., No. 07-3243-BLS2, 2011 WL 477263,
at *31 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2011).
363. Cf. Miss. Power & Light v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 388–89
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
364. Nev. Power Co., 99 FERC ¶ 61,047, at p. ¶ 61,190 (2002).
365. Blumenthal, 104 FERC ¶ 61,210 at P 21 (2003); but see Blumenthal 103
FERC ¶ 61,344 at P 4 (Brownell, Commissioner, dissenting in part) (“Prior
Commissions have acknowledged [that rejection is vital to a debtor’s ability to
reorganize] and stated quite clearly that ‘[a bankrupt’s] [sic] decision to reject its
contracts is an issue to be resolved before the Bankruptcy Court and is not subject
to the determination of the Commission.’”).
366. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2004).
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power to reject a FERC regulated contract and the power to enjoin FERC
from demanding specific performance.367 As a result, FERC changed its
stance.368
In 2006, FERC declared in California Electricity Oversight Board
(CEOB) that it was precluded from taking action under the FPA and that
it would follow the ruling of the Fifth Circuit, despite the fact that FERC
was litigating in the Ninth Circuit and thus not bound to the Fifth Circuit’s
decision.369 Furthermore, FERC stated that because rejection only results
in a breach of contract, parties need not be constrained by the restrictive
Mobile-Sierra doctrine.370 In fact, it even clarified that under the FPA,
when a party seeks to modify or abrogate its filed rate,
the issue is whether a party can terminate its obligations and
thereafter have no liability to its counterparty. To obtain such
approval, a party with a Mobile-Sierra clause must meet the very
high burden under the public interest test. However, in rejection,
the party does not seek to terminate its obligations and thereafter
be free of liability . . . Rather, the issue is how the public interest
bears on the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of whether to
permit [a party] to breach its obligations and, if so, to pay damages
for such breach as determined by the Bankruptcy Court.371
FERC’s reason for such inconsistency purportedly arose as a result of
reexamining and reviewing the FPA and Bankruptcy Code in response to
“the increase in bankruptcy-related litigation.”372 Based on its newfound
understanding of the FPA and Bankruptcy Code, FERC declared
concurrent jurisdiction with the bankruptcy courts, and insofar as its
declaration was inconsistent with its past findings, FERC departed
therefrom.373 Unsurprisingly, FERC did not cite any statutory authority in
either the FPA or Bankruptcy Code in making this assertion.374

367. Id. at 519–23.
368. See generally Cal. Elec. Oversight Bd., 114 FERC ¶ 61,003 (2006).
369. Id. at P 11.
370. Id. at P 12.
371. Id. at P 13.
372. ETC Tiger Pipeline, LLC, 172 FERC ¶ 61,155 at P 33 (2020).
373. Id.
374. See NextEra Energy, Inc., 166 FERC ¶ 61,049 at P 28 (2019), vacated,
PG&E v. FERC, 829 F. App’x 751 (9th Cir. 2020); ETC Tiger Pipeline, 172
FERC ¶ 61,155 at P 33; see also In re PG&E Corp., No. 19-30088, 2019 WL
2183380, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2019).
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B. The Bankruptcy Court’s Jurisdiction
Paradoxical though it may seem, the best way to harmonize the
statutes and policies of the FPA with the Bankruptcy Code is to give the
bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over the rejection of executory
contracts because the Bankruptcy Code is the only proper authority to
apply when rejecting an executory contract.375 To recapitulate many of the
aforementioned rules and arguments, Congress granted bankruptcy courts
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11.376 Pursuant
to this power, bankruptcy courts may enter judgments in core
proceedings.377 As relevant here, rejection of an executory contract
pursuant to § 365(a) is a core proceeding.378 Moreover, bankruptcy courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over all property of the debtor and of the estate,
including executory contracts.379 Therefore, bankruptcy courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over both executory contracts and the rejection
thereof. Referring to its own exclusive jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
expressed that “‘exclusive’ necessarily denies jurisdiction of such cases to
any other federal court.”380
Additionally, a bankruptcy court has original but not exclusive
jurisdiction over civil proceedings arising under, arising in, or related to a
bankruptcy case, notwithstanding any congressional act conferring
exclusive jurisdiction to another court.381 Accordingly, in such a case, a
bankruptcy court has concurrent jurisdiction over the civil proceedings.382
This grant of concurrent jurisdiction does not apply to FERC, though,
because the statute confers concurrent jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court
only when exclusive jurisdiction has been granted to another court.383
Quite simply, an administrative agency is not a court.384

375. In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 486 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019).
376. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
377. In re PG&E, 603 B.R. at 482; see also 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
378. 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); see In re Chesapeake Energy Co., No. 20-33233,
ECF No. 1, P 14 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2020).
379. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).
380. In re PG&E, 603 B.R. at 488 (quoting Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S.
73, 77–78 (1992)).
381. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
382. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32,
41–42 (1991).
383. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., No. 18-50757,
2018 WL 2315916, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 18, 2018).
384. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 502 U.S. at 41–42.

674

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

Moreover, insofar as rejection is concerned, the Bankruptcy Code
itself does much of the work.385 Section 365(a) speaks plainly, allowing
rejection of any executory contract, subject to the court’s approval—not
FERC’s.386 Conversely, neither the FPA nor the Bankruptcy Code grant
FERC the authority to adjudicate a rejection in bankruptcy.387
Further, the text states in unequivocal terms that rejection results in a
breach of contract,388 not an abrogation or modification.389 Despite
arguments to the contrary, a filed rate contract is just that—a contract; it is
not akin to a de jure regulation. Proceeding from this premise, the
foundation for concurrent jurisdiction further crumbles in light of the fact
that FERC does not even have exclusive jurisdiction over a filed rate
breach-of-contract claim outside of bankruptcy.390 This is because FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction over filed rates is not triggered unless it necessitates
an award for damages on an actual or presumed rate change.391 And
although the rejection counterparty would indeed receive less than a
dollar-for-dollar amount of damages, “that is how bankruptcy works.”392
To be clear, a court’s authorization of rejection does nothing to affect the
rate charged.393 The counterparty will file its pre-petition claim for
damages based on the FERC-approved rates; “[h]ow and when those
claims will be paid-out is an issue for the plan and confirmation

385. Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1661
(2019).
386. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Congress conditioned rejection on the court’s
approval, not FERC’s.); see also Tempnology, 139 S. Ct. at 1662 (“Sections
365(a) and (g) speak broadly, to ‘any executory contract[s].’”).
387. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 824; 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (vesting exclusive
jurisdiction over property of the estate to the bankruptcy court); In re PG&E
Corp., 603 B.R. 471 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019).
388. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
389. Blumenthal 103 FERC ¶ 61,344 P 5 (2003) (Brownell, Commissioner,
dissenting in part).
390. In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Ark. La.
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 579 n.6 (1981); Blumenthal v. NRG Power Mktg.,
Inc., 105 FERC ¶ 61,292 at P 3 (2003) (Brownell, Commissioner, concurring);
Blumenthal v. NRG Power Mktg., Inc., 103 FERC ¶ 61,344 at P 1 (2003)
(Brownell, Commissioner, dissenting in part).
391. Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 578–79 (allowing damages to stand that
didn’t affect rate); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Ala. Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1471–
73 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that courts are not preempted from awarding damages
so long as damages were calculated using the filed rate).
392. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, 622 B.R. 608, 625 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020).
393. Id.
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process.”394 Therefore, if FERC lacks exclusive jurisdiction over a filed
rate breach of contract outside of bankruptcy, and if FERC’s exclusive
jurisdiction is not triggered so long as damages are calculated using the
filed rate, then FERC’s demand requiring approval before a party can
cease performance on a rejected contract simply stems from the debtor’s
bankrupt status.395 Such disparate treatment of a debtor contravenes the
spirit of the Bankruptcy Code’s protection against discriminatory
treatment of a bankrupt debtor.396
C. Harmonizing the FPA with the Bankruptcy Code
As outlined above, whether FERC has exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction with the bankruptcy courts varies amongst the jurisdictions
that have addressed the issue. Further, the proper standard of review to be
used when determining whether a court should authorize rejection
likewise varies amongst the jurisdictions. FERC’s use of the MobileSierra doctrine’s public-interest standard of review is fundamentally at
odds with the purpose and function of bankruptcy; therefore, it fails to
properly harmonize the FPA with the Bankruptcy Code. The Fifth and
Sixth circuits, in an attempt to harmonize the competing interests of the
FPA and Bankruptcy Code, have adopted a heightened standard of review
that will allow rejection only if, after careful scrutiny, the equities balance
in favor of rejection. This Comment concludes, however, that neither
attempt at harmony is necessary.
When courts are confronted with two competing acts of Congress,
they must attempt to interpret and harmonize the statutes in such a way as
to regard each as effective if the two are capable of co-existence.397 As has
been demonstrated, FERC’s role is fundamentally at odds with the role of
bankruptcy and incapable of harmony. As a result, the best way to render
each statute as effective is to understand FERC’s jurisdiction, in relation
to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, as “having a parallel exclusive
jurisdiction.”398 If a party seeks to reject a contract and performance
thereon, that party must seek approval from the bankruptcy court, and only
the bankruptcy court, for that is where exclusive jurisdiction lies.
Alternatively, if a party wishes to modify or abrogate the rate it is paying,

394. Id.
395. See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 520–21.
396. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 525(a), 11 U.S.C. § 101(27).
397. In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 517 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
551 (1974)).
398. In re Extraction Oil & Gas, 622 B.R. at 627.
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but still continue performance on the contract, it must seek approval from
FERC, and only FERC. The two are separate matters.399
With this solution, there is no longer a need to determine which
standard of review is proper for a regulated debtor in bankruptcy. “Section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code does not mandate that the [c]ourt consider
public policy or public interest.”400 Instead, the public interest is already
taken into account by the very purpose of bankruptcy—allowing a debtor
to reorganize and start anew so that it may avoid liquidation and continue
to provide jobs and economic stimulus. Nevertheless, in the event that
public interest considerations need to be taken into account, as a court of
equity, the bankruptcy court is best suited to balance the impact on the
public interest. Accordingly, FERC’s role in bankruptcy should be limited
to expressing its views as a party of interest, just as any other affected party
would do.
CONCLUSION
FERC’s attempt to usurp the bankruptcy courts’ exclusive jurisdiction
over bankruptcy proceedings and estates is an ultra vires assertion of
authority. The Bankruptcy Code grants the courts exclusive jurisdiction
over the estate of a debtor, including its executory contracts; it is in the
court’s sole discretion whether to allow rejection. Although it is true that
courts are prohibited from collaterally attacking, modifying, or abrogating
a filed rate, that is not what occurs in bankruptcy. The rate will remain
intact because the rate will be used to calculate damages. Allowing FERC
to impede on the bankruptcy process by requiring continued performance
on a rejected filed rate is contrary to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority of
claims and inherently diminishes the total amount of the estate for other
claimants. Additionally, FERC’s mandate to utilize the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine is incompatible with the nature of bankruptcy. As a court of
equity, the bankruptcy court is well-suited and well-qualified to handle the
multifaceted public interests involved. Accordingly, the authority to allow
or deny the rejection of a filed rate rests solely and exclusively with the
bankruptcy courts.

399. Id. at 625.
400. Id. at 627.

